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Railways Reform in the Countries of the Former USSR: an Extended 
Introduction 
Nadezda Negovelova 
 
Abstract 
Railways restructuring in the countries of the former USSR has 
practically never been studied before. Meanwhile most of these countries are 
implementing the same reforms as their western neighbours put in force 
some years earlier. In this paper, we analyse railway reform trends in these 
countries and discover a huge diversity of approaches and states of progress. 
Besides, we make an extended review of literature on railways reforms 
which covers empirical and institutional papers, theoretical descriptive 
analyses and, in particular, the reform of Russian railways. Finally, the 
present study gives the background necessary to learn the situation in the 
region in question and to understand better the two papers which follow. 
 
1. Introduction 
The latter changes in the railway infrastructure and regulation on the 
former Soviet territory were caused more by the break of the USSR rather 
than by regulatory trends in Western Europe. There was a need to 
reorganize former regional departments of the unified Soviet railway, i.e. to 
decide on their organizational structures: whether it will be a unitary public 
enterprise, a public body, a corporation or some other form. Only later on, 
for countries – candidates to the EU (Baltic states), the need to adjust the 
rules of their operations to the European ones emerged. 
The structure of industry and purposes of restructuring are very 
different in these countries, especially in Russia and Asian countries, from 
those of Western European railways. First, there is no tough competition 
between railroad and road carriers, while the desire for an increase of 
railroad’s share in transportation markets is one of the most important goals 
of the reform in Europe. Second, in contrast to European railroads, Russian 
railroads and those of some of the countries in question are profitable. Third, 
freight operations are much more important than passenger operations in 
the countries – members of the former USSR (in Europe the share of 
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passenger operations is about 50%) and the average distance of haul is much 
larger than in Europe (Guriev et al. (2003)). 
The study covers the following countries: 
- Russia; 
- Eastern European countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova; 
- Baltic countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia; 
- Caucasus: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan; 
- Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kirgizstan. 
The main objective of this paper is to describe the situation in the 
railway sector of former USSR members, put in evidence some trends 
common to all or some of the new railways and analyze particular reform 
cases. The purpose of the paper is to give a broad picture of the progress in 
railway reforms in the countries which were recently unified by a common 
railway system – with common management, planning and strategy. 
Besides, I will present an extended review of literature on railways reform as 
well, although there is very little research on former Soviet railways. While 
there are several papers on Eastern European railways reforms and some 
studies of Russian railways reform (e.g. OECD (2001)), they all, first, don’t 
give a general picture of the situation on the territory of the former USSR; 
and second, they don’t take into consideration the railways of Caucasian or 
Asian parts of the former country. That is, the actual study is motivated by 
the need to look at the region as a whole, to discover the main trends, or, 
probably, to observe a diversity of reform patterns. Another goal of the 
paper is to provide an extended introduction to the two papers which follow 
(on governance choice and efficiency estimation of Eastern European and 
former Soviet railways). The present paper is the first integral study of 
railway reform in the countries of the former USSR. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the second chapter, a review of 
literature on railway reforms is presented. It covers empirical papers on 
European railway reforms, as well as some rare studies of railway reforms in 
transition economies. The third part describes common characteristics of the 
railways in questions such as share of railways in total country’s 
transportations, transit position and so on. The fourth part is dedicated to 
reform approaches. The fifth part contains come case studies – the reform 
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experience of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Estonia. The sixth 
part concludes. 
 
2. Review of literature 
Studies of the impact of rail restructuring can be roughly divided 
into two broad groups: formal econometric studies and case studies – policy 
reviews. The latter group includes numerous country-based case studies of 
reform experience and is not considered in the present paper. We make an 
overview of empirical works on railways which took into consideration 
railway reforms in Europe – from efficiency estimation prospective, 
mentioning, however, some rare works using the institutional approach 
(these two approaches are used in the two papers which follow). We also 
consider some non-empirical studies on railway reforms. 
A general analysis of railway reform and an overview of European 
and American experience can be found in the book of Gomez-Ibanez and de 
Rus (2006). They distinguish different types of reform measures – vertical 
separation, privatization and deregulation. However, they don’t cover 
railway reforms in transition economies and developing countries in Europe. 
The authors state that the econometric evidence doesn’t prove completely 
the statement that the separation of infrastructure from operations increases 
railways performance. Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004) also find opposite 
opinions about the separation of infrastructure from operations: while some 
authors believe that the separation of infrastructure brings advantages in 
efficiency, transparency, neutrality and competition, others affirm that the 
separation of railway infrastructure and operations have been a fundamental 
mistake. Overall, they say, it seems that there have been benefits from the 
introduction of competition into rail markets but separation of infrastructure 
from operations has been more problematic.  
As railways reforms in Europe started in the middle of 1980s, 
economists began to estimate their results empirically in the beginning of 
1990s. Most of them use panel data. The first important paper evaluating the 
reform impact was the work of Gathon and Perelman (1992). Estimating 
factor requirement frontier using panel data on 19 European railways over a 
period of 28 years and paying a particular attention to managerial 
autonomy, they discovered autonomy to be positively correlated with 
technical efficiency. 
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Another early paper to analyze railway reforms in Europe was the 
one of Oum and Yu (1994). They estimated managerial autonomy as well 
(applying non-parametric DEA, then Tobit regression, to a panel of 19 
railways over 12 years), but added one more aspect: implications of public 
subsidies. The main finding of the study is that increased competition via 
regulatory liberalization and deregulation has improved efficiency, which is 
in line with the reforms that began in the middle of the 1980s and were 
aimed at the separation of railway operations from infrastructure and the 
improvement of competition and performance in the sector. This result was 
discovered earlier for Canadian Railways (Caves and Christensen (1980)) 
and proven in other succeeding papers. Gathon and Pestieau (1995) and 
Cantos, Pastor and Serrano (1999) show, on the samples of European 
railways, that autonomy increases efficiency. However, both papers attribute 
the increase in efficiency mostly to technical change rather than reforms. 
Cantos and Maudos (2001) discover that a greater financial and managerial 
autonomy leads to higher levels of efficiency, while a higher level of 
subsidies would imply a lower efficiency. However, they state that, although 
regulation improved productivity, financial accounts got worsened due to a 
strong regulatory policy which leads to non-market behavior of the railway 
management due to the absence of competitive pressure. 
Gathon and Pestieau (1995) aimed to decompose technical 
inefficiency into two main parts: management inefficiency and the 
regulatory environment. The effects of institutional factors on the efficiency 
of railway companies is obtained by including an institutional autonomy 
index. They conclude that a railway company with a low autonomy index 
may increase the level of efficiency by increasing the level of managerial 
autonomy and reducing the level of regulation. 
Costs complementarity of different railways activities (passenger and 
freight transportations, infrastructure management) in the framework of 
vertical separation is analyzed by Cantos (2001). He uses a panel of 12 
railway companies over a period of 18 years emphasizing the problem of 
vertical integration or separation. He discovers that costs of passenger and 
freight operations were independent, while costs of freight operations and 
infrastructure management are complementary. He concludes that railway 
costs complementarity should be taken into consideration when taking a 
decision about the organizational form (vertical separation or integration). 
Cost complementarities were discover as well for U.S. railways (Ivaldi and 
McCullough (2001, 2004), Bitzan (2003)). Taking costs complementarities into 
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account, Preston (1996) found that the optimal size for a vertically integrated 
railway was that of one of the medium sized European companies such as 
Norway or Belgium. It appeared that splitting the larger companies into 
several separate companies might be worthwhile; however, this result was 
based entirely on vertically integrated companies, so the implications for 
separate infrastructure and operating companies of such splits are unclear. 
Economies of scope in European railways are analyzed by Growitsch 
and Wetzel (2006, 2007). They apply the DEA method to a multi-input and 
multi-output input distance function and discover that integrated companies 
are relatively more efficient than vertically separated. 
The sequence of reform measures (third-party access, independent 
regulation and the separation of infrastructure from operations) was studied 
by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2004). They estimate a Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier model on the sample of 11 European railways over the 
period of 21 years. They state that deregulation increases efficiency, but this 
effect depends on the reform sequence. The results did not show any 
evidence that full separation of infrastructure from operations is a necessary 
condition for increasing railroad efficiency. It was also found that smaller 
railways improved efficiency more than larger ones. 
The transaction costs economics literature on railway stays apart. 
While the methodology of empirical estimation of governance choices is 
quite developed, there are very few empirical works applying transaction 
costs economics to railways. Some references to Coase and Williamson 
approach can be found in Pittman (1991, 2007), but he doesn’t provide any 
empirical prove of his statements. 
Menard and Yvrande-Billon (2005) apply transaction costs economics 
approach to the British rail reform and they find that transaction costs have 
an impact on the organizational choice. The most significant results are 
found for assets specificity. Yvrande-Billon (2000) finds arguments in favor 
of vertical integration in the case of British railways. She reveals the 
problems of opportunistic behavior and, again, assets specificity. In 
Yvrande-Billon (2003), she states that British rail reformers didn’t take into 
consideration transaction costs. She analyses the length of contracts and 
discovers that, taking into account assets specificity, the length of contracts is 
not optimal in sense that it doesn’t minimize transaction costs. 
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Rail freight contracting was also analyzed by Palay (1984). He 
confirms the statement that asset specificity bring the parties to a more 
sophisticated institutional structure unique to the transaction.  
A broad review of literature on the reform of network industries in 
developing and transition economies can be found in Estache, Perelman and 
Trujillo (2005). Their study covers mostly Latin-American and Sub-Saharian 
railways, though some of the papers reviewed include other railways 
worldwide. They didn’t mention any considerable works on Eastern 
European or Soviet railways. They make an overview of studies of reforms 
and their implications to performance, taking into account different 
measures of performance – because efficiency concerns were included in the 
design of regulation. Technically, the papers reviewed are not very different 
from those on developed countries in terms of methodology. 
Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2005) discover some common 
features of papers on railway reforms in transition economies. First, most of 
these papers, like those on Western European railways too, deal with two 
main characteristics of the railways sector: multi-output production and 
natural monopoly. A second interesting characteristic of this literature is that 
because cost minimization assumptions tend to be difficult to measure due 
to lack of data, most performance studies deal exclusively with physical 
output (freight ton-km or train-km and passenger-km) and input 
(employment, length of tracks (electrified or not), rolling stock and energy 
consumption) quantities and most are interested in production efficiency 
measurement only. 
Those of the reviewed papers which concern Africa reveal a strong 
impact of political disturbances on performance. Estache, Perelman and 
Trujillo underline the impact of such disturbances on the railway 
performance of the national companies of Congo-Brazzaville (CFCO), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (SNCC) and Kenya (KRC). The authors of 
these papers point out the dramatic increase in competition from the 
trucking industry resulting from improved road network coverage and the 
poor intermodal and inter-network coordination in Africa. 
The literature on railways in transition economies also offers useful 
insights on the impact of reforms and in particular privatization of railways 
services. For example, the railways of Malawi and Cameroun managed to 
stay in a good position close to the efficiency frontier. But the improved 
performance of these railways is due to strong reductions in inputs (staff 
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and rolling stock) rather than improvements in outputs (passenger or tons 
kilometer). The main problems highlighted are: organizational and 
management issues, maintenance problems caused by the age of equipment 
(rolling stock and tracks). 
For two special cases, Brazil and Argentina, where vertical separation 
didn’t take place, in both freight and passenger transportation sectors, 
Estache, Perelman and Trujillo mention high rates of productivity growth 
after the reform, 5,3% in freight and 9,8% in passengers transportations on 
average. And, as in the case of Brazil’s privatization, this increase is mainly 
concentrated on the output side. Moreover, as a result of the reform in 
Brazil, private operators have improved performance in terms of both 
quantity and quality. 
There is a shortage of comprehensive specialized literature 
evaluating the economic impact of railway reforms in the member countries 
of the former USSR – from theoretical, empirical or institutional point of 
view. Russian railways reforms and those of Eastern European countries 
entering the EU (or candidates) are analyzed in some but rare studies, while 
railways of the former Soviet republics like those of Middle Asia or 
Caucasus are left aside. There is no clear study which would estimate the 
efficiency trends of Eastern European railways and discover any relationship 
between regulation (especially the transfer from the planning system to 
market) and efficiency. 
Diaconu et al. (2007) study the reform experience of Eastern 
European countries – candidates to the EU. The future EU membership was 
an incentive to implement the reform; moreover, these countries have 
reformed their railways structures along lines “more catholic than the Pope”: 
full vertical separation rather than simply third-party access. However, 
although the reform has been implemented successfully, the private 
participation is still very low in practically all these countries (see Table 3). 
The theoretical analysis of Russian railways reform is provided by 
Dementiev (2005, 2006). He develops a model of access price and tariff 
setting and illustrates how this model works when applying to Russian 
railways. He also explains why there was a need to reform Russian railways 
and which regulatory measures, among those suggested by regulation 
theory, were imposed. 
 8 
One exiting detailed reform study is made in the book of Guryev 
(2008) “Iz tupika. Istoria odnoy reformy” (translation: “From the dead end. 
One reform story”). The author analyses the history of railway reform in 
Russia after the break of the USSR citing important persons of that period – 
public officers and top managers of emerging transport companies. He 
investigates a difficult transition to market oriented economy with which the 
railway reform had to be in line, while the old soviet planned mentality 
prevailed in minds of “reformers”; he demonstrates the development of 
railway legislation starting from the very early nineties. 
Given the importance of railway transport in Russia, it is not 
surprising that railway top managers and public officers involved in 
regulation of the Russian railways take some attempts to develop “a railway 
science”. The current president of RZD (since 2005) Vladimir Yakunin wrote 
a book called “Politologia transporta. Politicheskoe izmerenie transportnogo 
razvitia” (translation: “Political science of transport. Political dimension of 
transport development” // Moscow, 2006, 244 pages). He was convinced 
about the crucial role the transport plays in a country’s economy, but also in 
its political development; he affirmed that the transport system represents 
an instrument of the realization of a country’s geopolitical interests; 
especially it concerns the railway transport in Russia. The idea is that in 
order a country can benefit from its geopolitical position, a rational 
strategically oriented transport system planning is needed. Yakunin even 
pretended to found a scientific field, a branch of political science dedicated 
to the role of transport. 
A considerable contribution to the analysis of Russian railways 
reform has been done by Pittman (Antitrust Division, US Department of 
Justice). He wonders whether vertical separation implemented in Western 
Europe is really the best reform option. He demonstrates that Russian 
railways are different from the European ones (reasons and goals of the 
reform, types of transportations, distances, institutional environment, 
legislative requirements, economic situation) and suggests them a model of 
horizontal separation taking the US or Latin American railways as an 
example. He states that the European wide experience didn’t reveal any 
considerable increase of performance of separated railways in comparison to 
integrated; instead, some studies which he cites reveal economies of scale 
and scope, i.e. arguments in support of vertical integration. 
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The US railway model (competition between vertically integrated 
railway companies) and its advantages were also emphasized by Nash and 
Rivera-Trujillo (2004). In contrast to Western European countries, Northern 
American railways are oriented to the freight market rather than to the 
passenger one and different reasons can be given for this particular 
difference, partially because of long distances. For instance, in the cases of 
Canada and the United States, passenger airplane transportations are more 
convenient than railway transportations. Moreover, within a deregulated 
environment with high technological progress and significant competition, 
the air industry has been able to offer lower fares and lower travel time in 
comparison to rail transport. Therefore, railway passenger operations in the 
American continent have not been competitive. As a result, the air industry 
in the USA and Canada has been clearly dominant against the railways, 
taking the second place in the interurban transport passenger market. 
Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004) state that in the case where there is a 
vertically integrated firm in each region (as in South America), there is a 
possibility to introduce competition, by introducing private sector 
participation by giving a concession which includes the infrastructure and 
the operations of a well-defined region for a certain period of time (as in 
Latin America). They state that there is competition for the market – 
competition for getting a concession. However, this kind of competition is 
very limited due to considerable sunk costs involved in each region, making 
necessary a significant investment. In fact, in some cases, the concessions are 
given for 30 or even 50 years practically eliminating the competition for the 
market. 
Table 1 contains a summary of some important studies of railways 
regulation and reform in which we are interested in the context of the 
present paper: reform overviews, empirical works, institutional papers, 
studies of Russian railways reform. 
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Table 1: Some important studies of railways reforms worldwide 
 Paper / book Approach and/or 
methodology 
Geographical 
coverage 
Conclusions 
Estache, Perelman and 
Trujillo 
Infrastructure Performance 
and Reform in Developing 
and Transition Economies: 
Evidence from a Survey of 
Productivity Measures 
2005 
Overview of empirical papers 
on reforms and regulation in 
network industries, including 
railways, in developing and 
transition economies 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa, East Asia, 
Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, 
Middle East and 
South Asia 
In transport, private operators have 
tended to perform better than public 
operators in developing countries. 
There is a very strong case to push 
regulators in developing and transition 
economies toward a more systematic 
reliance on yardstick competition in a 
sector in which residual monopoly 
powers tend to be common. 
Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus 
Competition in the 
Railway Industry: An 
International Comparative 
Analysis 
2006 
Descriptive theoretical 
overview of the reforms in 
application to some railways 
worldwide 
Great Britain, 
France, Spain, the 
USA, Latin 
America 
The experience to date favours the 
introduction of competition with 
vertical integration rather than through 
vertical unbundling; competition while 
maintaining vertical integration has 
been very successful in improving 
railway performance. 
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Diaconu, Pittman, Sip, 
Tomova, Wronka 
Competition in Freight 
Railways: “Above-the-rail” 
Operators in Central 
Europe and Russia 
2007 
Overview of the reform 
experience in some railways of 
Central and Eastern Europe 
and Russia 
Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Slovak 
Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Russia 
EU membership is an incentive for 
more liberal reforms. 
New market entrants (independent 
operators), although their share is 
rather low, manage to catch some 
market segments. 
“Russia will always be Russia” in the 
sense of central control. 
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Gathon and Perelman 
Measuring Technical 
Efficiency in European 
Railways: A Panel Data 
Approach 
1992 
Empirical study, panel data 
Factor requirement frontier 
estimation of technical 
efficiency 
19 European 
railways 
1961-1988 
Institutional managerial autonomy is 
positively correlated with technical 
efficiency. 
Oum and Yu 
Economic Efficiency of 
Railways and Implications 
for Public Policy: A 
Comparative Study of the 
OECD Countries’ Railways 
1994 
Empirical study, panel data 
DEA estimation of productive 
efficiency and Tobit regression 
as the second step 
19 railways in 
OECD countries 
1978-1989 
Regulatory liberalization and 
deregulation has improved 
competition in the railway sector and, 
as a result, railways efficiency. 
Gathon and Pestieau 
Decomposing Efficiency 
into its Managerial and its 
Regulatory Components: 
The Case of European 
railways 
1995 
Empirical study, panel data 
DOLS, two-stage approach 
19 European 
railways 
1961-1988 
A railway company with a low 
autonomy index may increase the level 
of efficiency by increasing the level of 
managerial autonomy and reducing 
the level of regulation. 
Cantos, Pastor and Serrano 
Productivity, efficiency 
and technical change in the 
European railways: A non-
parametric approach 
1999 
Empirical study, panel data 
Malmquist productivity index, 
DEA 
Estimation of productivity by 
breaking down its growth 
into changes in efficiency and 
technical change 
17 European 
railways 
1970-1995 
Most increases in productivity have 
occurred thanks to improvements in 
technology and not due to more 
efficient behaviour of railway 
companies. 
The degree of autonomy and 
professionalism in management is a 
key element in explaining companies’ 
levels of efficiency. 
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Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes 
Railway (De)Regulation: A 
European Efficiency 
Comparison 
2004 
Empirical paper, panel data 
LISREL 
Production efficiency frontier 
11 European 
railways 
1980-2000 
Deregulation increases efficiency, but 
this effect depends on the reform 
sequence. Full separation is not a 
necessary condition for improving the 
efficiency. 
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Growitsch and Wetzel 
Testing for Economies of 
Scope in European 
Railways: An Efficiency 
Analysis 
2007 
Empirical study, panel data 
DEA super-efficiency 
bootstrapping model 
Construction of a set of 
virtually integrated firms 
54 European 
railways 
2000-2004 
Integrated railway companies are 
relatively more efficient than 
”virtually” integrated companies (i.e. 
separated) and the majority of railway 
companies indicate economies of 
scope. 
Ivaldi and McCullough 
Subadditivity Tests for 
Network Separation with 
an Application to U.S. 
Railroads 
2004 
Empirical study, panel data 
Generalized McFadden cost 
function, Baumol’s test of costs 
subadditivity and operational 
separation test 
22 U.S. railways 
1978-2001 
Vertical and horizontal economies of 
scope are discovered. 
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Caves and Christensen 
The Relative Efficiency of 
Public and Private Firms in 
a Competitive 
Environment: the Case of 
Canadian Railroads 
1980 
Empirical study 
Total factor productivity index 
2 Canadian 
railways 
1956, 1963, 1974 
No evidence of relatively higher 
performance of private railways (vs. 
publicly owned) is found. Competition 
has a positive impact on performance. 
Pittman 
Specific Investments, 
Contracts, and 
Opportunism: The 
Evolution of Railroad 
Sidetrack Agreements 
1991 
Institutional approach U.S. freight rail 
contracts between 
carriers and 
shippers 
In the presence of sunk, relationship-
specific investments, the form of the 
contractual relationship between the 
parties makes a difference in terms of 
future behavior; the problem of hold-
up (opportunistic behaviour) is crucial 
in contracting between shippers and 
rail forwarders. 
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Pittman 
Make or buy on the 
Russian railway? Coase, 
Williamson, and Tsar 
Nicholas II 
2007 
Institutional approach; 
regulation of network 
industries 
Russia When taking transaction costs into 
account, horizontal separation may be 
preferred. Transactions costs analysis 
may 
support the preservation of vertical 
integration to create competition where 
that is feasible. 
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Menard and Yvrande-
Billon 
Institutional Constraints 
and Organizational 
Changes: The Case of the 
British Rail Reform  
2005 
Institutional approach, 
transaction costs economics 
Rail contracts in 
Great Britain 
accompanying the 
creation 
of the train 
operating 
companies 
Transaction costs influence the 
organizational choice. If the degree of 
specificity of assets has a direct impact 
on the choice of a governance 
structure, the choice of an 
organizational arrangement 
reciprocally influences the nature and 
characteristics of investments made. 
Guriev, Pittman, 
Shevyakhova 
Competition vs. regulation: 
a proposal for railroad 
restructuring in Russia in 
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Dementiev 
Reforming Russian 
Railways. Introduction of 
Competition and New 
Regulatory Challenges 
2005 
Overview of the Russian 
railways reform and a simple 
theoretical model of 
competition 
Russia Russian railways are implementing the 
most “regulatory intensive” reform 
pattern, i.e. introduction of 
competition with railway incumbent 
present both in infrastructure services 
and operations. 
Russian railways faced “oil-induced 
internal competition” stimulated by 
the limited capacity of pipelines and 
high price of crude oil. 
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3. Common characteristics 
This chapter contains an overview of some characteristics which are 
common to all railways in the countries – members of the former USSR. It is 
important to understand, from one side, their similarities and from the other 
side, the diversity of the reforms they implemented. 
First, given very high volumes of raw materials transported 
(especially coal and oil) and relatively long distances, the crucial role of 
railways in the countries of the former USSR is not surprising. A high share 
of railways in total transportations (especially freight transportations) is a 
common characteristic of these railways. In Russia, the share of freight 
railway transportations in total freight transportations is 40-45% (in tkm), 
more than 50% in Ukraine, 87% in Belarus. This share is relatively low in 
countries isolated from international transport corridors: in Armenia this 
share is about 30% (RZD-Partner). 
For comparison, in Western European countries (not USSR 
members), the share of railway transport is less than 10% both in freight and 
passenger transportations (Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004)). 
Second, the countries whose railways make part of an international 
transport corridor have a higher share of railways due to their transit 
position. This means that the share of transit in total transportations of these 
railways is relatively high. In Ukraine, for example, in 2007, the share of 
transit was about 14% of total freight railway transportations. It gave 50% of 
total Ukrainian budget incomes. It is constantly growing (mainly railway 
transit to ports), but for the moment, the infrastructure is not sufficient. In 
Georgia, again, due to its transit sea-side position, the share of transit is even 
higher: 65% of total freight transportations. In Estonia, another maritime 
country, before recent political conflicts with Russia, railway transit 
accounted for 75% total freight railway transportation, but considerably 
decreased in 2007. Lithuanian ports are smaller and the share of railway 
transit is lower: about 35% (RZD-Partner). The railways of Middle Asia, 
realizing their geographic position, are still planning to increase their transit 
transportations. Turkmenistan is working on the construction of the railway 
which will connect Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran and open (to 
Turkmenistan) access to Middle-Asian and South-European ports. Tajikistan 
is working on the railway project from Afghanistan to China via Kirgizstan 
and Tajikistan. 
 15 
Third, the freights transported by railways are mainly raw materials 
and natural resources: oil, coal and metals, although Russian railways and 
the railways of countries with access to the sea are diversifying freight 
patterns and, in particular, increasing container transportations. 
As a general rule, the rail mode has a competitive advantage over 
road transport in carrying large quantities of goods which have a low value 
per unit weight – so-called “bulk” goods: grain, coal, oil, minerals and 
chemicals. For almost all other freight services, rail faces strong competition 
from the road mode. In countries which are substantial producers of bulk 
commodities such as Russia (as well as China and the US), the rail mode 
tends to have a substantially higher share of the overall freight transport 
market (OECD (2005)). 
 In Russia, coal accounts for about 20% of total freight 
transportations, oil for 15%. In Estonia, before political conflicts with Russia, 
oil transportations accounted for more than 60% of total Estonian railway 
freight transportations (oil transit was bringing about 6% of Estonian budget 
incomes), but they have to find ways of freight diversification because 
Russia intends to transfer all the oil transportations to Russian ports by 2015 
(until 2008, about 80% of Russian exports of oil and oil products were 
passing by Baltic ports), which will hurt Baltic railways very much. In 
Latvia, the share of oil transportations is 50% (RZD-Partner). 
The fourth common characteristic of the railways of the former USSR 
is the obsolescence of rolling stock. In Russia, 75-85% of fleet units are used 
after their expiry term. In 2007, the average age of freight wagons was 21,4 
years old. In Ukraine, the share of obsolete rolling stock is 60-90% (RZD-
Partner). 
Fifth, the railways of the former USSR member countries still 
constitute a unique economic space, especially those of the CIS. These 
countries work on eliminating custom and other bureaucratic barriers to 
movements of freights and passengers. 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are creating the Custom Union 
which was expected to start operating in 2008-2010. Ukrainian and Russian 
railways have signed some agreements on the mutual help and elimination 
of competition between 2 enterprises. This concerns the purchases of rails 
and other materials, as well as rolling stock. Ukrainian railways, together 
with Russian and Kazakh railways, have a common tariff system as well. 
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They have some agreements of the common use of rolling stock, for 
optimization purposes. Armenia is also working on facilitation of custom 
regulations with Russia. 
The CIS has the Council of railways transport whose main goal is the 
coordination of common operation, elaboration of principles, organization of 
common use of rolling stock. 
 
4. Reform 
Many countries, especially developed ones, have attempted to 
improve the performance of their railways since 1980 by introducing or 
strengthening competitive or market forces. Three distinct methods have 
been used: vertical unbundling, privatization and deregulation. The main 
difference between these approaches is that unbundling requires important 
government involvement in the industry while deregulation and 
privatization reduce it considerably. If the intense competition that the 
railways face makes vertical unbundling less attractive, it also increases the 
appeal of privatization and deregulation (Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006)). 
In Western Europe, the general reform trend is to separate the 
monopolistic segment from the competitive ones. As noted by Laffont (in 
Pittman (2007)), vertical separation is taken to be the mainstream 
restructuring form of industrial structure, by default. The EU reform 
strategy thus is based on three pillars: a) unbundling infrastructure from 
operations, b) creating independent regulatory institutions for railways, and 
c) opening access to national railway markets for competitors (“third party 
access”). There is a firm belief among many policy-makers, on both EU and 
national levels, that these reforms ought to increase efficiency 
(Pittman (2007)). 
Table 2 contains a comparison of reform measures in Europe and 
North and South America. Eastern European countries tend to implement 
the same reform measures as their Western neighbors. 
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Table 2: Western European railways vs. North and South American 
railways 
 Western Europe 
North and South America (USA, 
Canada, Mexico, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile) 
Organisation 
Separation of infrastructure 
from operations (at least for 
accountancy purposes) 
Regional separated 
(private companies and 
concessions of vertical integrated 
companies) 
Market focus Passenger oriented Freight oriented 
Ownership 
Mainly public with a few 
exceptions (e.g. UK) 
Private and concessions 
Distances Short Long, Medium 
Source: Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004) 
 
The principal early reformers among Central and Eastern European 
countries – Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, then Bulgaria 
and Romania – have adopted economic restructuring plans designed to 
convince the EU of the seriousness of their liberal reform strategies and 
hence their suitability as EU candidates. In these countries the vertically 
integrated state-owned incumbent monopoly railway has been separated 
into independent companies, including the infrastructure company, the 
freight train operator, and the passenger train operator. In addition, most of 
the governments have set up regulatory bodies, with varying degrees of 
formal independence. The market power of the incumbent operator is also 
controlled and regulated by competition authorities. 
As a result of the reforms, in Romania, the share of private train 
operating companies is reached 20-25% on a ton-km basis (many of these 
companies either large shippers integrating upstream or former freight 
forwarders), more than 15% in Poland. In Czech and Slovak Republics there 
are few private train operating companies capturing small market shares, in 
Bulgaria and Hungary (and Russia) the share of such companies is even 
smaller (Diaconu et al. (2007)). 
Tables 3 and 4 contain evaluations of private sector participation in 
railways. Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2005) calculate the percentage of 
countries where private sector is presented, in a total of countries in the 
corresponding region. Diaconu et al. (2007) don’t explain the methodology 
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of their calculations, subjectively evaluating the share of private operators in 
a total of freight turnover. 
 
Table 3: How present is the private sector in railways? Share of countries 
in total number of countries (2004) 
Developed countries 65% 
Developing countries 37% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 47% 
East Asia 43% 
Eastern Europe 20% 
Latin America 56% 
Middle East 20% 
South Africa 17% 
Source: Estache, Perelman, Trujillo (2005) 
 
Table 4: Estimated share of private train operating companies in total rail 
freight 
Country Percentage of total tkm 
Bulgaria 0 
Hungary 0 
Russia Near 0 
Slovak Republic Less than 5% 
Czech Republic Less than 5% 
Poland 15% 
Romania 25% 
Source: Diaconu et al. (2007) 
 
If we now look at the reform / regulation patters of the countries – 
members of the former USSR, we can observe a considerable diversity of 
reforms implemented as well as the level of their progress. We can 
schematically derive 5 types of the reform measures: 
- The absence or initial stage of the reform, the railway is still 
operating as a public administration; 
- The railway is operated by a public company – a unitary state 
enterprise (not a joint stock company); 
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- The railway is commercialized (corporatized), the sale of some non-
profile business or daughter companies is going on or expected; 
- The railway was privatized; 
- The railway is operating under concession; 
- Horizontal separation of railways. 
Almost in all the cases, the access to track is open for independent 
operators (although, in most cases, they emerge exclusively for 
transportation needs of some large, mainly resource-based, corporations and 
not for commercial operating purposes); this measure doesn’t correspond 
exclusively to some reform models. The same is true about independent 
regulator: formally, railway activity is regulated by several bodies like 
ministries of transport, antitrust agencies and other. Actually, they are not 
always “independent”: the decisions are still imposed by political forces and 
sometimes can not be justified economically. 
Among economists and policy makers there is no consensus about 
the best reform model. Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006) state that “the 
evidence is arguably slightly stronger for integration than for unbundling, 
but the jury is still out”. Pittman also have serious doubts about the necessity 
of vertical separation, but suggest another solution: competition between 
vertically integrated companies (see below). 
This last case, horizontal separation of railways, stays apart. It was 
implemented neither in the EU nor on non-EU post-soviet railways, but 
actively suggested by Pittman affirming that successful American (Latin 
American and North American) experience can suit well Russian railway 
realities. The European vertical separation experience, instead, didn’t reveal 
any clear proofs that efficiency has been increased after separation (Guriev et 
al. (2003)). 
In this section, a brief description of reform models is presented. 
More details can be found in case studies (section 5). 
 
4.1. Public administration 
Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006) mention that the transformation of 
public bodies departments into commercial entities increases their 
productivity. In Western Europe, this process of transformation took place 
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much earlier and was practically completed by the beginning of the reform 
(separation of operations from infrastructure, open access, implementation 
of an independent regulatory body etc) in the late 1980s. The process is 
going well also in the countries of Eastern Europe: most of them operate as 
corporations. Newly created railway entities after the break of Yugoslavia 
were organized in the form of commercial enterprises. In the majority of 
countries of the former USSR, instead, it was not the case. 
After the break of the USSR, each of new countries created its own 
railway administration. The first were Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian 
railways in 1991 which were transformed from public administration into 
public enterprises in 1992. They were followed by Ukraine which created the 
State administration of railway transport which existed at least until the end 
of 2008. Middle-Asian railway were divided into separate railway 
administrations later, some of them were transformed into state-owned 
companies, some remained public administrations (Tajikistan; Azerbaijan in 
the Caucasus). Some were transformed in public enterprises rather late (e.g. 
Kirgizstan in 2005). 
The largest among the former Soviet railways, the Russian railways 
company RZD, was created only in 2003. Before, it had been operating as a 
Ministry of railway transport (MPS). 
 
4.2. Unitary public company 
This is one of the two most common forms implemented in the 
countries – members of the former USSR. In this case, the railway is 
managed as a commercial entity, but represents a unitary undividable body 
100% owned by the State. The railways which have adopted this model are 
those of Belarus, Moldova, since recently the railway of Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan; probably, the Ukrainian railways will be 
transformed into such a unitary public company. 
This form allows, from one side, to comply with reform trends 
(commercialization of railway public authorities), and from the other side, to 
protect the railway from the dissipation of shares, i.e. to protect the state 
from the lost of control over this strategically important capital. 
This form doesn’t exclude the open access for independent operators, 
like in Belarus and Azerbaijan.  
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4.3. Corporation 
This is another form which is very common when implementing the 
railway reform. This is also the most frequently used model in European 
railways – Western European as well as Eastern European ones. It often 
assumes vertical separation. This approach, in the case of Western Europe, 
assumes further accounting separation of railway infrastructure from 
operations, probable privatization of some businesses, and open access of 
independent operators to the infrastructure. 
Full vertical separation has the potential to enhance the resulting 
level of competition because it eliminates the incentive of the infrastructure 
owner to restrict access to certain operators. On the other hand, such vertical 
separation may increase the costs of production (through the loss of 
economies of scope) and also lead to underinvestment in infrastructure. 
Many countries have accompanied mandated access to the track 
infrastructure with various forms of separation of the infrastructure from 
train operations. For most Western European countries, this takes the form 
of accounting separation or corporate separation. EU Directives require at 
least accounting separation between infrastructure and train services and the 
complete separation of certain key regulatory tasks (such as train path 
allocation) from an existing railway undertaking. Only a few countries 
(including the UK and Sweden) have prevented the infrastructure provider 
from providing all train services (OECD (2005)). 
The first case of vertical separation was given by the Swedish 
railways, when in 1988 the infrastructure management was separated from 
the traffic operations (Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004)). 
Corporatization took place in Russia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Georgia and Uzbekistan. The railways are working on separation of 
operations and non-profile businesses in daughter companies which are 
usually 100% owned by the mother company. Non-profile businesses, 
however, will be probably sold (partially or completely) on the stock market 
or are listed there even now. 
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4.4. Privatization 
Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006) provide pros and contras of the 
privatization. Without privatization, the train-on-train competition is very 
slow to emerge in Europe or Australia and is unnecessary given the intense 
competition from other modes. Vertical separation, in the absence of 
privatization, complicates the coordination of train operations and 
infrastructure maintenance. Proponents of unbundling insist that private 
railways performe reasonably well outside of Britain. Privatization has 
sometimes proven difficult in developing countries where private railway 
operators and governments have become embroiled in disputes over tariffs 
and conditions of services (Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006)). 
The British experience of privatization is the best known in Europe. 
The original intention was to privatize the train operating companies but to 
leave the infrastructure company, called Railtrack, in public hands at least 
for ‘the medium term’. In 1994, Railtrack was established as an internal 
division of British Rail and in 1995 it became a separate government-owned 
company. The idea was to establish a track authority or company to own 
infrastructure with separate private companies operating the train services 
(Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006)). The main problem turned to be the 
underinvestment in infrastructure. Following a serious accident caused by 
poor infrastructure maintenance, the private infrastructure company, 
Railtrack, was placed in the hands of receivers and a new non-profit 
company, Network Rail, took its place (Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004)). 
As there is a lack of privatization experience in Europe, few empirical 
works can be found studying performance of private vs. public railways, but 
those which exist put in evidence a positive impact of privatization on 
railways performance. Cowie (1999) analyzed Swiss railways and found that 
private railways had a significantly higher level of technical, managerial and 
organizational efficiency. Politt and Smith (2002) found that a privatized 
structure of British railways lead to significant improvements in operating 
efficiency, and industry outputs have risen after privatization. 
Among the railways of the former USSR, only one was privatized: 
the Estonian railway. It was privatized in 2001: 66% of the share capital of 
Eesti Raudtee AS were sold to an external investor, Baltic Rail Services 
(BRS), in August 2001. This was the first privatization of a vertically 
integrated national railway in Europe. The proportion of private sector 
participation in the Estonian railway industry was not only the highest in 
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the region, but arguably the highest in Europe as a whole, even including 
the UK. In 2006, the Estonian railway was deprivatized. Further details are 
presented in the next part of the paper. 
The privatization of Georgian railways is also under discussion, but 
there are still no formal projects. 
 
4.5. Concession 
A textbook concession example is the Latin American concession 
experience. The move to private provision of railway services was motivated 
by fiscal goals (governments were in economic difficulties), as well as by the 
desire to stop the decline of railways. Most railways were offered as a 
concession or lease of limited duration (usually 30 years for freight with 10-
20 years possible extensions, passenger concessions were shorter), with the 
infrastructure reverting to the state at the end. Under concessions, the 
railways remained vertically integrated: the new concessionaires were 
responsible for both infrastructure and train operation in their service (or 
geographical) areas. The grants of access were typically selective so that the 
concessionaire had exclusive rights to most of his system. In Latin America, 
the reforms appear to have significantly improved railway performance 
(Gomez-Ibanez and de Rus (2006)). 
Concession management is a rare case among the former Soviet 
railways. The only railway operating under concession is the Armenian 
railway. It is managed by a 100% daughter company of the Russian 
Railways company created especially for this purpose. The concession 
period covers 30 years with the possibility of extension. 
The Armenian case is presented in details below. 
Another railway considering the possibility of concession is the 
Georgian railway company. It operates in the form of Limited responsibility 
company. The reform would implement accounting separation, open access 
and even privatization of some parts of business. The concession plans 
assumed the management period of 89 years, the main concessionaire 
candidate was the British company Parkfield Investment. Finally the plans 
failed, and Georgian railway authorities are still considering other reform 
approaches. 
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4.6. Horizontal separation of railways 
This reform model was applied in Central and South America – and 
especially in the largest countries, including Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. It 
has left in place vertically integrated companies – typically private 
concessionaires – that control both infrastructure and operations. In 
maintaining vertically integrated companies, these countries have followed 
the examples of the United States and Canada, both of which have systems 
of vertically integrated railway companies that compete with each other to 
carry cargoes. The main difference between US model and Latin American 
model is that in the first case, railways compete parallel, while in Latin 
America they have some regional monopoly power, it is “geographic” or 
“source” competition. It is clear that geographic competition is in principle 
inferior to parallel competition as protection from the monopoly power of a 
railway line. However, this competition is sufficient to force the railway 
companies to offer lower rates and better service to get the customer’s 
business. 
Restructuring into competing vertically-integrated companies would 
be a challenge in Europe where railway companies have historically served 
not different routes but different national territories. The EU is seeking to 
develop trans-European freight routes. In one possible future development, 
different international freight routes (either East-West routes or North-South 
routes) would be owned and operated by different railway companies. One 
study for the European Union briefly raises the possibility of a similar 
structure for passenger railways (Steer Davies Gleave (2004) in OECD 
(2005)). 
Careful restructuring of an existing rail network into separate rail 
companies operating separate rail paths may create effective competition, 
especially for freight services. This form of competition appears to be most 
attractive in those countries with a dense rail network which could be 
separated to form a number of competing operators and for which there is 
limited public sector expertise or experience in sophisticated regulatory 
arrangements required for mandated access to the track infrastructure. For 
these reasons the OECD recommends this approach for Russia and China 
(OECD (2005)). 
Moreover, the model will work in cases of hinterland exportations 
via ports and there is a choice which port to use. If there is, instead, a need to 
provide internal transportations from a precise point A to a precise point B, 
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the model of geographical competition doesn’t work in sense that it doesn’t 
bring competition to the railway sector. 
Pittman (2001) suggests that a variant of the Latin American rail 
reorganization system may be appropriate for Russia: the creation of a 
number of vertically integrated regional monopolists, connected at cities 
and/or large production centers to provide source competition at those 
points. “It is extremely doubtful that the regulatory system and the rule of 
law are of sufficiently high quality to enforce the option of vertical 
restructuring with competition, and the unlikelihood of much train 
competition renders the vertical separation option unattractive. A system of 
regional integrated monopolists seems the best outcome for the time being” 
(Pittman (2001)). 
Long-term concessions on vertically integrated railways may help to 
achieve three goals simultaneously: to promote competition, to increase 
investments and to keep state ownership of infrastructure. Competition 
between concessions will be possible if there are enough “parallel” tracks. 
Though in the Eastern part of Russia the geographic structure of railroads 
makes such scheme hardly possible to implement, the Western part of the 
railroad network, instead, is dense enough to organize “parallel” 
competition (Guriev et al. (2003)). 
However, in application to Russian railways, this model was rejected 
by ex-vice railway minister Anna Belova: “We could accept holding 
structure, if an isolated railway were a profit center. But our business 
peculiarity is that it is a network business. Some of railways are mostly 
loading freight, other are unloading it, some serve for transit and so on, i.e. 
the profit is formed across the whole network rather than on an isolated 
railway. This is the reason why we decided to preserve a unified commercial 
entity which encompasses different business divisions according to different 
types of activity” (Belova in Guryev (2008)). 
 
5. Case studies 
5.1. Russia 
General picture 
In Russia, in the end of nineties, the railways accounted for 5% of 
Federal Government budget and contributed 3,7% to GDP (less than 3% in 
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2008). The national railway company RZD is the largest state-owned 
monopoly in Russia with 1,3 million employees and assets amounting to 5-
15% of all assets in the economy. 
The Russian rail system is the second after the US Class I railroads in 
network size and average length of freight movement, and third in ton-km 
(after the USA and China). Russian railway transport accounts for 21,6% of 
the world railway freight ton-kilometers and 7,6% of railway passenger-
kilometers (correspondingly, 71,4% and 26,4% of European railways). 
Rail accounts for more than 40% (in tkm) in the freight transport 
market. Road haulage accounts for six times the tonnage of the railways, 
however, the distance is generally short. In the European Russia road 
haulage accounts for 40% of tkm and that share is predicted to increase in 
line with improvement of quality of road. However, in the Eastern part of 
the country, railways has almost monopolistic position in transport area 
(Dementiev (2005)). 
The main freight commodities carried by the railway are the 
following. Coal accounts for the largest part of traffic (21,8% of tones 
carried), followed by crude oil and oil products (17,1% of tones carried). 
Construction materials account for 16,3%. 
The average distance of transportation by railroads exceeds 1300 km 
(Guriev et al. (2003)). 
Reform 
Although first suggestions about commercialization and 
corporatization appeared in 1991 and were reflected in a president’s order in 
1992, the real Russian railways reform can date back to the year 1997 when 
the first regulatory document appeared – President’s order №426 “Concept 
of structural reforms of natural monopolies”. It encompassed 3 stages and 
assumed the completion of the reform by 2000. Even in that first document 
some progressive ideas could be found, such as: elimination of cross-
subsidies, introduction of competition, privatization of non-core businesses, 
open access to infrastructure and maintenance facilities, creation of 
independent regulator. 
The second attempt to formalize the reform was undertaken in 2000. 
It was the project of Conception of the structural reform on Russian railway 
transport, which also included 3 stages. At that time, it became clear that the 
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main reform measure must be the separation between administrative and 
commercial duties. Such issues as demonopolization, open and non-
discriminatory access to infrastructure, separation between competitive and 
monopoly businesses were accentuated. 
Having been modified, the document was approved in 2001 and also 
covered 3 stages, but the term of the reform completion was extended to 
2010. The main goal of the reform was “to improve the efficiency of railways 
by means of the creation of competitive environment, increase of financial 
transparency and attraction of investment”. 
In the first phase (2001-2002), the railways were split into two 
separate entities, responsible for regulation and commercial operation. RZD 
was created in the form of corporation in July 2003, the old Ministry of 
railways (MPS) was dismantled in 2004 transferring its regulatory functions 
to the Ministry of transport; this brought a lot of confusion to the 
administrative functions. At the same time, in 2001, first independent 
operators officially got permissions to operate. In the second phase (2003-
2005) daughter companies had to be created (separated from RZD), but this 
process went slower as supposed. Some of daughter companies were 
supposed to be sold out later – completely or partially. The goal of the third 
phase (2006-2010) was the “creation of a developed competitive railway 
market”: newly created daughter companies had to compete with private 
operators on some market segments. 
In general, the main trends of Russian railways reform may be 
summarized in the following way: 
- separation between administrative and commercial functions; 
- separation of businesses in the form of commercial entities; 
- promotion of competition on the railway market; 
- tariff deregulation. 
However, complete vertical (infrastructure vs. operations) or 
horizontal (regional or other division) separation is still not a decided issue; 
the advantages of such step still have to be evaluated on the third stage of 
the reform (2006-2010). 
That is, important measures which were undertaken are: 
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- Separation between administrative and commercial functions: it was 
done in the framework of administrative reform which assumed 3 
levels of executive power: ministry – service – agency. Some of 
regulatory functions were moved to the Ministry of transport, other 
were taken by the Railway agency. 
- Creation and partial selling of daughter companies in freight 
transportations (in passenger sector, the Federal passenger company, 
by the end of 2008, was approved but not created yet). 
- Non-core businesses were separated. 
- Several private operators appeared (or got the status of railway 
operating companies) and are working in passenger and freight 
railway segments.  
- In some market segments, tariffs (wagon part of tariffs) got 
deregulated. Actually, in freight transportations, 15% of tariffs are 
deregulated (this share is planned to be brought up to 50% within 
next years). 
However, in the new railway strategy (2008-2030) the restructuring is 
not among the main goals; instead, the main issue is the modernization of 
rolling stock and infrastructure as well as improvement of railway services. 
One of the most important innovations was to delegate some 
activities to newly created daughter companies and thus to keep control 
over transportations within a holding structure which contradicts to 
competitive intentions of the reform. 
In 2007, 15 daughter companies were created, the biggest of them is 
the First Freight Company (PGK), and others include 7 maintenance and 
repair companies, research centers and so on. Before 2007, other daughter 
companies were created, such as is OAO Transcontainer, OAO Refservice 
and OAO Transles. The total number of daughter companies in the middle 
of 2008 was 52. In 2007, total revenues from daughter companies were 156 
milliards of roubles, which equals to 16% of RZD’s revenues from its main 
activities. These companies got the most profitable segments, rolling stock, 
clients of RZD, but at the same time, they are not subject to tariff regulation. 
They still have some preferences in the access to infrastructure and 
bureaucratic procedures. It is then clear that they grow faster and have more 
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power than independent operators. Probably 100% of these companies will 
be sold off. 
OAO Transcontainer was created in 2006 in the segment of container 
transportations. It got more than 21 thousand of fitting platforms, 47 
container terminals (slightly more than 5% of total RZD terminals, but they 
serve more than 80% of total container turnover) and other assets. In 2007, 
the market share of Transcontainer (on the market of container 
transportations) was more than 60%. The company operates not only on the 
Russian market. In 2007, 15% of Transcontainer shares were sold. 
The First Freight Company (PGK) was created in 2007 and operates 
on the market of transportation of oil and oil products (35% of its total 
tonnage), coal (more than 30%), cement (14%), construction materials, 
ferrous metals and other freights. It has agreements with leading industrial 
producers. In 2008, it transported 100 mln tones, which is about 7% of total 
freight transported on the RZD network. When created, PGK received from 
RZD more than 200 thousand of freight wagons which is 21% of total 
railway freight wagons in Russia and which is six times more that the 
number of wagons of its follower (N-Trans company with 35 thousand of 
wagons). 49% minus 2 shares are supposed to be sold. 
The Second Freight Company will be created as well. 
OAO Refservice was created in 2005 and began operating in 2006. It 
got about 6 thousand wagons. It operates on a very profitable market 
segment – transportations in refrigerators. Its market share in this segment is 
60% and it often abuses its dominant position. 25% of its shares are planned 
to be sold. 
On the freight transportations market, the share of RZD together 
with its daughter companies is now slightly more than 50% and is 
permanently decreasing. 
Actually, more than 2000 small companies operate on the freight 
market (32 companies on the passenger market). In 2007, freight transported 
in private rolling stock accounted for 527 million tones and its share 
increased from 32,2% of total railway transportations in 2006 up to 35,3%. By 
2010, the market share of independent operators is expected to stabilize on 
the level of 28%. Private operators have in total about 325 thousand freight 
wagons. In private wagons more than 70% of total oil products are 
transported, more than 60% of fertilizers, more than 50% of ferrous metals. 
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That is, they work in the most profitable market segments. Mostly they are 
companies affiliated to industrial producers transporting their freights. 
The first was OOO Link Oil Spb created in 1997. In 2001, the 
legislation provided these companies with the status of operators. By the 
middle of 2002, there were 54 operating companies transporting 10% of the 
total freight volume. Their tariffs are out of regulation. 
As for passenger transportations, soon after the creation of OAO 
RZD, Federal passenger direction was created and it will be transformed to 
the Federal passenger company later on. It will get from RZD 46 wagon 
depots, 332 railway stations, more than 25 thousand passenger carriages and 
other assets. At the end of 2008, the Ministry of transport approved the 
creation of the Federal passenger company in the form of RZD daughter 
company. Probably there will be tenders for operation franchises. 
The main problem is the loss from passenger transportations. In 2004, 
revenues from passenger transportations covered only 2/3 of their costs. The 
deficit was about $1 billion. However, RZD affirms that the deficit is not 
very high – only 0,8 eurocent of subsidies per 1 pass-km, while in the USA it 
is equal to 12 eurocent, almost 14 in Canada, 2,5 in France, 6 in Germany and 
4,5 in Great Britain (Guryev (2008)). 
The problem to solve was whether passenger transportations should 
be financed by cross-subsidies from freight incomes or these should be the 
expenses of federal, regional or local budgets. Since 2007, federal budget 
compensates RZD losses in long distance passenger transportations due to 
regulated tariffs (10,9 billions of rubles in 2007, 16,4 in 2008, 22,6 in 2009, 24,7 
in 2010). As for short-distance commuter trains, in 2009 regional budgets 
will compensate 50% of losses which are due to regulated tariffs, 75% in 2010 
and 100% in 2011. Tariff regulation will not be abolished because of 
universal service obligations, as declared by Russia prime-minister V. Putin. 
In passenger transportations, the first independent operator is ZAO 
Okdail created in 1991. In 2002, another company, ZAO TK Grand Service 
Express, appeared which was a challenge in passenger transportations: its 
main activities concerned high-class modernization of passenger carriages 
and VIP passenger transportations – in Russia as well as in other post-soviet 
countries. That is, like in freight transportations sector, in passenger 
transportations, independent operators caught the most profitable market 
segments. 
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5.2. Ukraine 
General picture 
Ukrainian railways are the second largest railways after Russia 
among the former USSR member countries – according to the length of track 
as well as to the amount of virtual tone-km transported. The share of 
railways in total freight turnover (without pipelines) is more than 80%, in 
passenger transportations they have more than 60%. Ukrainian railways 
have a high share of freight transportations (about 70%) due to their transit 
position: huge amounts of Russian freight pass by Ukrainian ports. Transit 
freight transportations are constantly growing and in 2007 accounted for 
about 20% of total freight railway transportations. Ukrainian railways are 
still the donor of the state budget. 
However, one of the main problems to solve is the loss in passenger 
transportations which constantly grows (+33% in 2007, +27% in 2006, +22% 
in 2005). Revenues from passenger transportations cover less than 40% of 
costs, in local passenger transportations – not more than 15%. The main 
reasons of losses in passenger transportations is the obsolescence of the 
rolling stock and reduced tariffs for several categories of passengers 
(according to the communication of the Ukrainian transport minister Iosif 
Vinskiy, passenger tariffs in Ukraine are 5 times lower than in Poland and 2 
times lower than in Russia), i.e. lower incomes don’t allow to collect enough 
money to invest in the renewal of the rolling stock. 
In 2008-2020, 19,4 mlrd euro will be invested in the renewal of the 
rolling stock. Its obsolescence is about 60-90%. In 2008, the investment in the 
modernization of the rolling stock is planned to reach 2,2 milliards Euro. 
Another problem are relatively low freight tariffs: they are lower 
than in Russia and Belarus; tariffs in ports are 2-3 times lower than in Baltic 
and Russian ports as well. 
Reform 
By the end of 2008, Ukrainian railways have still been operating as a 
public body called Administration of railway transport of Ukraine. There 
were 2 reform projects: to transfer the administration into an integrated 
unitary publicly owned enterprise or to a corporation with future intention 
to privatize some parts of business (complete privatization is excluded, but 
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some businesses are expected to be sold out). The concession model is also 
considered possible as a form of public-private partnership in order to 
attract investment. However, concession legislation lacks. 
In 2006, the “Conception of the state reform program for railway 
transport” was issued. It was aimed at corporatization and separation of 
operations from infrastructure. But 2 years later it was rejected. Even if the 
corporatization is assumed to be the most suitable reform model, it was not 
the right time because of the lack of corresponding circumstances 
(legislation, regulation etc). 
In 2008, the Ministry of transport and communication announced a 
new reform agenda. Within the period 2008-2015, it will encompass 2 stages 
and will finally lead to a corporate structure. 
1. On the first stage (2008-2009), the 6 Ukrainian railways and other 
affiliated bodies will be organized as a unitary public enterprise “Ukrainian 
railways” managed by the Ministry of transport and communications. The 
locomotive fleet will be transferred to another (unitary) division: this will be 
the first step to the principles of vertical structure management (holding 
company). The newly created enterprise will also be the owner of 
infrastructure. 
The Railway transport authority will be created in order to separate 
the duties on the regulation and economic activity. The Authority will be 
financed from the state budget and will act within the structure of the 
Ministry of transport and communication. 
2. The second stage (2009-2015) assumes corporatization of the 
unitary public enterprise and creation of daughter companies. Daughter 
companies will own infrastructure, locomotives and about 50% of total 
freight fleet. 
At this stage, independent operators should appear – in freight (will 
own about 50% of total freight fleet) as well as passenger transportations 
(will own about 10-15% of total passenger fleet). In 2008, in Ukraine, the 
share of private wagons is about 28%. 
Tariff regulation will remain in the duty of the Ministry of transport 
and communications. 
Starting from 2009, a new Price list is in force. Its main innovation is 
the division of the tariff in three parts: infrastructural, locomotive and 
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wagon part. The first two remain subject to regulation. The wagon part is 
regulated only for the incumbent Ukrainian railways company, while 
private operators set this part by themselves. 
 
5.3. Kazakhstan 
General picture 
Kazakh railways are the third largest railways after Russia and 
Ukraine among the former USSR member countries – according to the length 
of track as well as to the amount of virtual tone-km transported. The share of 
railways in total freight turnover (without pipelines) is more than 60%, in 
passenger transportations they have about 60%, too. 
During the Soviet period the Kazakh railway system was operated by 
three regional divisions of the Soviet Ministry of railways. Because of the 
predominance of bulk raw materials carried over long distances, these 
railways were always among the most profitable in the Soviet system. 
Economic transition, and the disruption of trading relationships with the 
break of the Soviet Union, meant that by 1999 traffic had dropped to a 
quarter of its level in 1989. However, since then the resource boom has seen 
strong growth of about 40% in traffic between 1999 and 2002. Now, the share 
of freight in total (virtual) railway tone-km is 85%. 
Resource transit is the most important type of Kazakh railways 
transportations. 50% of the total transit freights are Russian goods. Among 
them, there is Russian oil transported to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russian 
wood transported to Central Asia and China, Russian metals transported to 
Uzbekistan. Almost 100% of wheat which passes in transit by Russia is from 
Kazakhstan. It is tranported to Germany, Azerbaijan, Tunisia, Turkey and 
Egypt. In 2007, transportations between Russia and Kazakhstan accounted 
for 104 million tones. 
The axis Russia – Central Asia – China is a strategic axis in 
Kazakhstan’s railway transportations. Trade turnover between Kazakhstan 
and China in 2007 accounted for $13,8 mlrd (+66% to 2006), but is expected 
to reach $15 mlrd yearly soon. China is the fourth biggest trade partner of 
Kazakhstan. 
As practically all railways of the former USSR, Kazakh railways are 
obsolete. Obsolescence of rolling stock is about 75%. A 5-year investment 
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program which started in 2008 has a goal to reduce this share to 12-15%. In 
2007-2011, $4,7 billion will be invested in the modernization of the railway 
network. In total, about 80 investment projects are planned until 2015 for the 
total cost of $30 billion which will come from different sources, public and 
private. 
Reform 
Kazakhstan is the pioneer, among former soviet railways, in the 
implementation of railways reform. The main objective of the reform was 
the creation of competition in railway operations and attraction of private 
investment. It’s important to notice that a complete (legal) separation within 
a holding structure was assumed by the reform from the very beginning. 
In 1991, the Ministry of transport and communications was created, 
while all the railway assets remained owned and operated by 3 regional 
railways. This important step of separation between administrative and 
commercial functions was done in Russia only in 2003. In January 1997, all 
Kazakh railways were put together within the same structure: unitary 
publicly owned enterprise Kazakh railways, which in March 2002 was 
transformed in a 100% Close Joint-Stock Company. This was the completion 
of the first stage of the railway reform adopted one year before with a new 
Railway Law. The reform assumed 3 phases: 
- Phase 1 (2001-2002): commercialization and divestment of social and 
non-core activities; 
- Phase 2 (2002-2004): competition and institutional changes; 
- Phase 3 (2004-2006): privatization (partial); this phase was 
suspended. 
There was a significant progress in implementing the first phase of 
the plan. All social and cultural activities had been divested by the end of 
2003 and all supporting activities (for example, track and rolling stock repair 
workshops, telecommunications, security systems etc.) have been 
transformed to separate companies. Passenger operations were set up as a 
separate company under the Ministry of Transport and Communications in 
2003. In January 2004, the freight train operations and 60 000 freight wagons 
were transferred to the newly-created State-owned freight operator (JSC 
Kazzheldortrans, in 2007 renamed into Kaztemirtrans). In 2003, the 
locomotives were transferred to a separate company (JSC Locomotiv). 
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The reforms established separate roles between: 
- Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) which 
determines railway industry policy and approves access for private 
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) wishing to use railway 
infrastructure; 
- KTZ which will in future remain a publicly-owned railway 
infrastructure company; since October it’s a part of the newly created 
“AO National welfare foundation Samruk-Kazyn” 
- KTZ’s passenger business (JSC Passenger Transportations) and 
freight business (JSC Kaztemirtrans) which will be commercially 
autonomous (though publicly owned) TOCs; 
- JSC Locomotiv which is assumed to provide tracking stock to 
independent operators on the commercial basis; 
- The Regulator (the Anti-Monopoly Committee) which will approve 
the track access regime and track charges on the basis of non-
discrimination between TOCs (whether public or private). The Anti-
Monopoly Committee reports directly to the President of the country. 
The market of freight transportations is competitive. In 2007, the 
share of privately owned fleet was 35% (more than 30 000 wagons). It is 
planned to increase this share up to 60% by 2010. In 2007, 180 companies had 
their own private wagons. The market share of private operators is about 40-
50%. The operation component of the freight tariff (locomotive component 
and wagon component) is deregulated, while the infrastructure component 
will remain under state regulation. 
Given that passenger transportations are not profitable, they will be 
subsidized. The final price (for consumers) will remain regulated. Passenger 
transportations were put in franchise tenders: operators requiring the least 
subsidies are the winners. As a result, in 2005, the firs independent private 
operators appeared on the market. 
 
5.4. Armenia 
General picture 
Armenia has the third shortest network length among the former 
USSR members (after Tajikistan and Kirgizstan). Between 1989 and 1999, 
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Armenian railways lost about 93% in its traffic volume, and now they have 
the second smallest (after Kirgizstan) volume of virtual tone-km. In 2006, 
only 2,70 million tones of freight were transported which is 10 times less 
than in the soviet époque (in 2007 already 2,98 million of tones 
demonstrating the growth of 9,7%). It’s expected to increase freight 
transportations up to 50 million tones of freight yearly by railways, i.e. the 
main goal of the reform is to give back the importance which the railway 
had before the break of the USSR. 
The share of railways in total freight transportations is about 30%. 
The railways are strategically important: freight can be delivered to Armenia 
only by railways from Georgian ports (80% of cargoes cross Georgia 
reaching sea ports, then, they are transported to Russia and Ukraine). There 
is no other connection to European-wide railway network. International 
transportations account for about a third of total transportations. More than 
30% of freight is ore freight. 
Armenian geographical position is the weakest point. The country is 
isolated from international transport corridors which pass by Armenian 
neighbors, Turkey, Georgia and Iran. The situation will get even worse 
when a new railway project will be completed: Georgia, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan plan to build a railway excluding Armenia: Kars – Ahalkalaki – 
Tbilisi – Baku. As a result, Armenian railways will loose some freight 
transportations. The construction had to start in 2008, but was suspended 
because of the war. On the other hand, the projects of railway lines 
connecting Armenia to Iran are under discussion. The works had to start in 
2009 and last up to 5 years. The line will be a strategically important in the 
context of Armenian isolation from the main transport corridors. 
Reform 
The railway operates in the form of closed joint-stock venture. But it 
has the unique, among the railways of the former USSR, experience of 
concession. The concession was found to be a solution in order to attract 
large investment needed for the renewal of infrastructure and rolling stock 
and for the recovery of railway activity, bringing railway volumes to the 
level of Soviet époque. 
In October 2007, Armenia announced the intention to give its railway 
to a concessionaire for 30 years with a possibility of extension for 20 years 
more after the first 20 years of operation. Among the candidates to manage 
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the Armenian railways were some foreign railway companies, including the 
Russian RZD which in January 2008 was announced to be the winner. 
For concession purposes, RZD created a 100% daughter company 
named South-Caucasian railway. Officially it began operating in June 2008. 
As supposed, the concession will last 30 years with a possibility of extension 
for extra 20 years after first 20 years. RZD will invest $400 million in 
infrastructure and $170 million in the rolling stock, a total of $570 million 
including $230 million within the first 5 years. The employees of the 
Armenian railways will be formally transferred to South-Caucasian railway 
with an increase of salary by 20%. It’s expected to increase freight 
transportations up to 30 million tones yearly. 
The goals of the concession will be not only to increase railway 
transportations, but also to modernize the infrastructure and to develop the 
collaboration with neighboring states. 
 
5.5. Estonia 
General picture 
Estonian railways have productive characteristics (traffic, network 
length, network density etc) around average. The share of railways in total 
freight transportations is about 50-60%. The share of freight in total virtual 
tone-km is very high – more than 90%: probably because automobile 
passenger transport is more competitive on such short distances. 
Estonian transport system is very dependent on transit 
transportations, especially those from Russia. Prioritized freight types are oil 
(more than 60% of total Estonian freight transportations) and freight in 
containers. About 80% of Russian oil exports pass by Baltic ports. Before 
political conflicts, Russia transported about 25 million tones of oil and oil 
products yearly through the port of Tallinn, the largest of Estonian ports. 
The transit of Russian oil gave to the Estonian budget about 6% of its 
revenues. The incomes from all types of transit on the Estonian territory give 
20-25% of its GDP. Transit transportations are 75% of all transportations (-
24,5% in 2007; domestic transportations increased in 2007 by 50%). 
But Russia plans to cancel oil and coal transportations via Baltic ports 
and transfer them to Russian ports by 2015. This will particularly hurt 
Estonian railway: while ports have some chances to survive (container 
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transportations from China), the Estonian railway, which is dependent on 
transit, will suffer a lot. 
Reform 
In 1997 the state-owned enterprise Eesti Raudtee was split into a 
number of new entities:  
- the main company became a vertically integrated joint-stock 
company Eesti Raudtee AS responsible for the main international 
lines and freight services using them, as well as for managing the 
infrastructure;  
- predominantly domestic passenger lines in the south and east of the 
country were vested in a new passenger company, Edeleraudtee Ltd, 
which was then privatized: Edelaraudtee even now offers some 
passenger services on Eesti Raudtee’s network under a service 
contract with government for which it pays track access fees to Eesti 
Raudtee;  
- international passenger services (to/from St Petersburg and 
Moscow) were transferred to a train operating company, EVR 
Express; 51% of shares were sold to investors and 49% were retained 
by EVR; 
- commuter trains in the Tallinn area were also transferred to a 
suburban train operating company, Electriraudtee Ltd., still publicly 
owned.  
In April 2000, the Estonian privatization agency announced the sale 
of 66% of the share capital of Eesti Raudtee AS to a strategic investor 
through an international competition. Following a rather vexed competition 
in which an initial preferred bidder was unable to complete the transaction, 
majority ownership was sold to the second preferred bidder, Baltic Rail 
Services (BRS), in August 2001. This was the first privatization of a vertically 
integrated national railway in Europe. The proportion of private sector 
participation in the Estonian railway industry was not only the highest in 
the ECA region but arguably the highest in Europe as a whole, even 
including the UK. 
However, in 2006, after several court deals, the Estonian government 
bought back these 66% of the Estonian railway at the price of 150 million 
euro (lower than the company’s value). The decision was explained by the 
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need in a more intensive development and renewal of the railway which 
was not achievable under the management of BRS. Neither the state nor the 
private owners of Estonian Railways were happy with the piling of disputes 
and the non-cooperative atmosphere; the differences were mostly fueled by 
disagreement on infrastructure access charges and other provisions covering 
open access operators. 
In October 2007, the minister of Economic Affairs and 
Communications suggested to split Eestii Raudtee vertically into 3 
companies: one for infrastructure, one for operations and one for their 
coordination, encompassing the other two. The intension was to give more 
transparency to the rail sector. By January 2009, the restructuring was 
complete. 2 new daughter companies were created: AS EVR Infra and AS 
EVR Cargo. 
The tariff policy is being elaborated by the Ministry of economy and 
communications. 
As for market shares, there are 3 main railway companies on the 
market: Eestii Raudtee – 62,8% of market, Westgate Transport – 23,4%, 
Spacecom – 13,8%. There is a passenger operator Corail which, however, is 
not very successful: from September 2008, it closed the line Tallinn – St. 
Petersburg because the tariffs of using the infrastructure were too high for it. 
Other independent operating companies are Navirail (created in 2007) and 
Baltic Rail AS (created in 2008). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Worldwide experience demonstrates that vertically integrated 
companies tend to perform better. However, this option (to remain 
integrated or introduce competition between vertically integrated 
companies) is almost never taken into consideration by reformers – either in 
Western Europe or in the former USSR. The “default” trend is vertical 
separation – accounting or complete legal separation, although it doesn’t 
necessary lead to higher performance. 
The analysis of the former Soviet railways shows that only one of 
them, the Kazakh railways, has implemented the reform at the same level 
and dimension as it has been implemented in Western European countries. 
Estonian railways could also be considered as an avant-garde example due 
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to their privatization, but the experience turned to be not successful, and 
now they are implementing “traditional”, evolutional measures such as 
vertical (accounting) separation within one publicly owned holding 
company. Moreover, the development of Estonian railways is very 
problematic for political reasons: a huge part of their transportations depend 
on Russian freight, which is planned to be transferred to Russian ports in 
near future. 
There is no common trend in the reform progress among the 
railways in question. Instead, a great diversity can be observed: operation as 
a government body, unitary public company, corporation with vertical 
separation of infrastructure and operations, concession and, in past, even a 
privatization experience (however, non-core businesses are being privatized 
or are planned to be privatized by most railways). Horizontal separation has 
been discussed only at academic level, but never taken into consideration by 
railway policy makers. 
What is common is the understanding of the need to reform: in order 
to modernize railways, to make them more competitive, to catch back the 
volumes of freight transportations of the Soviet époque (to maintain the 
important role of railways is the goal of most former Soviet railways), 
finally, to adjust to market-oriented economy. 
Probably the reform is not going fast because, due to high volumes of 
profitable freight transportations, the railways managers have an illusion 
that everything is working well and don’t feel the necessity to reform. A 
good example is the Russian railway company RZD, which until 2003 had 
been operating as a railway ministry. 
Summarizing, we can state that the reform is being executed and the 
recovery of railways is going on. 
The two papers which follow are dedicated to empirical estimations. 
First, railways performance is estimated using the SFA approach; the first 
step of the reform, the transformation of public bodies to commercial 
entities, is taken into consideration. The second paper applies transaction 
costs economics approach to railways and investigates the impact of 
governance choice, in terms of vertical separation or integration, on railways 
performance. 
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Estimation of Technical Efficiency of Eastern European and Former Soviet 
Railways Using Stochastic Frontier Approach 
Massimo Filippini, Nadezda Negovelova 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the issue of technical efficiency of Eastern 
European and former Soviet Railways, an issue of concern to policy makers 
because of the change in the organization of the railway transportation 
sector introduced during the last decades in these countries. The fact that 
railway companies exist in different institutional forms, as independent 
state-owned public companies and as units of the public administration, 
raises the issue of their relative technical efficiency.  
The study is based on a panel data set for a sample of railway 
companies operating in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Republics 
over the period from 1991-2007. The empirical analysis is performed using a 
parametric input  distance function with an unbalanced panel data set 
composed of 28 railway companies observed over 17 years, with a total of 
368 observations. We apply two different models within the stochastic 
frontier efficiency measurement. The first model is the classical stochastic 
frontier model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977), whereas the second is a 
random coefficient stochastic frontier model. This model proposed by 
Greene (2005a, 2005b) is able to capture in different ways the unobserved 
heterogeneity of the companies.  
The results of a Kruskal-Wallis test for the differences in inefficiency 
scores do not indicate any significant difference in the level of efficiency 
between companies operating with varying institutional forms. Further, no 
significant difference between companies operating in different geopolitical 
regions has been found. 
 
1. Introduction 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s 
several Eastern European countries and several former Soviet Republics 
have introduced important economic and political reforms in order to 
transform the old command economic system into a more market-oriented 
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system. During this period these countries have also introduced a reform of 
the organization and regulation of the railway sector with the goal to 
improve the efficiency and the quality of its services. Most of these reforms 
have introduced new regulation instruments and new institutional forms for 
the companies in order to provide incentive and managerial instruments for 
the improvement of productive efficiency. These railway reforms, either 
being designed or implemented, include the following elements: 
transformation of the institutional forms of the railway companies, tariff 
reform, horizontal unbundling (separating freight and passenger business 
lines), vertical unbundling (separating infrastructure management and 
operation services), competitive access of independent operators to the 
tracks, and improved sector regulation (setting up an independent 
regulator). 
The majority of the railway companies operating in these countries 
has not been privatized and, therefore, are public. Moreover, from the 
institutional point of view, some of these companies are still administrative 
units, e.g. firms without legal status integrated directly in the public 
administration, whereas others have their own legal status, e.g. corporations 
or independent state-owned public companies with a special status. These 
types of public railway companies are generally more independent of 
political and public administration processes than companies directly 
included in the public administration. This mixed economy raises the 
interesting issue of the effects of different institutional forms on costs. Little 
empirical analysis has been done in the comparison of technical efficiency of 
these two types of institutional forms in transition countries.  
In this paper we test the hypothesis that railway companies 
integrated directly in the public administration are less efficient than those 
managed as corporations or as independent state-owned public companies. 
This hypothesis is based on the fact that the managers of the railways 
integrated in the public administration are faced with more bureaucratic 
constraints than those in public corporations. Moreover, agency problems in 
the public administration are more frequent than in public corporations. 
This hypothesis is tested using a two-stage methodology. In the first stage 
the railway companies’ efficiency scores are estimated using an input-
distance frontier function. The estimated results are analyzed in a second 
stage to test for a significant difference between the two types of institutional 
forms. 
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Of course, we are aware that comparing the productive efficiency of 
different railway companies usually assumes that they operate under the 
same technology. However, there might be unobserved characteristics such 
as network and technological differences between the railways which 
influence the production process which in consequence might be labelled as 
inefficient. It seems obvious that this problem is even more relevant and 
important when it comes to comparisons of railway companies which 
operate in different transition countries with different political and economic 
systems. That is why the special focus of this paper is on the application of a 
stochastic input distance frontier model based on panel data which is able to 
capture in different ways unobserved heterogeneity. Using a random 
coefficients frontier model proposed by Greene (2005a, 2005b) enables us to 
identify firm-specific effects and, moreover, to distinguish between the 
heterogeneity captured by firm-specific effects and inefficiency. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized in the following way: 
section 2 contains a brief review of literature on the efficiency estimation in 
the railway sector. Section 3 is dedicated to the model specification. Section 4 
describes the data and econometric models used in the empirical analysis. 
The results are presented in section 5. Section 6 contains a statistical analysis 
on the impact of the institutional form on the efficiency. Conclusions are 
summarized in section 7. 
 
2. Review of literature 
There is a wide range of literature on the efficiency estimation in 
railways. We have concentrated on those papers which use a frontier 
function approach and/or take into account institutional environments in 
which railways operate. We also tried to follow chronologically the trend in 
railways efficiency analysis which evoked the idea of efficiency estimation of 
countries in transition. The summary of literature review is presented in the 
Table 1. 
The first study using a frontier technique to analyze efficiency in the 
railway sector was done by Perelman and Pestieau (1988). They applied the 
deterministic COLS method to estimate the efficiency of public enterprises 
on the sample of 19 European plus Japanese National railroads over the 
period of 14 years (another part of analysis is devoted to postal services). 
They built a translog frontier production function with 2 outputs (for freight 
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and passenger transportations) and 4 inputs (labour, energy, rolling and 
fixed stock). Exogeneous factors directly incorporated in the production are: 
line-km per square km, percentage of electrified lines, track-km per line-km, 
average passenger journey and average length of haul ton. 
A step forward was the introduction of public policy in the analysis. 
Oum and Yu (1994), besides estimating the efficiency with the DEA method 
on the sample of 19 OECD countries over the period of 12 years, evaluate its 
dependence on subsidies and managerial autonomy. Two alternative output 
measures are used: 1) revenue-output measures (passenger-/ton-km) and 2) 
available output measures (passenger/freight train-km). In order to estimate 
the effects of policy and other variables beyond the control of management, 
a Tobit regression model is applied. The main result is that increased 
competition via regulatory liberalization and deregulation has improved 
efficiency, which is in line with the reforms that began in the middle of the 
1980s and were aimed at the separation of railway operations from 
infrastructure and the improvement of competition and performance in the 
sector. This result was discovered earlier for Canadian Railways (Caves and 
Christensen (1980)) and also proven in other succeeding papers. The impact 
of managerial autonomy was also analyzed by Gathon and Perelman (1992). 
There are relatively few studies which extend efficiency analysis to 
the impact of rail restructuring. On the sample of 16 European railways over 
the 21-year period, Cantos and Maudos (2001) estimate cost and revenue 
frontier functions. They use a 2-output (passenger-km and freight-km and 
corresponding revenues derived from freight and passenger 
transportations), 3-input (operating costs for energy, labour and materials 
and external services) specification and discover that different measures of 
efficiency give different results: for most railways cost efficiency generally 
increased, while revenue efficiency dropped. One of the reasons may be a 
strong regulatory policy which leads to non-market behavior of the railway 
management due to the absence of competitive pressure. 
Different aspects of deregulation and the sequence of the reforms 
were studied by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2004). They built a Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier model including individual fixed effects through the 
introduction of time and time multiplied by the deregulation dummy 
variable. The analysis encompasses 3 reform components: third-party access, 
independent regulation and separation of operations from infrastructure. 
The sample covers 11 European countries over the period of 21 years. The 
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authors also prove the statement that deregulation increases efficiency, but 
this effect depends on the reform sequence and full separation is not a 
necessary condition for improving the efficiency. 
In sum, the reform (the goal of which is to induce more competition) 
is found to have a positive effect on the efficiency, but the econometric 
evidence does not completely prove the statement that the separation of 
infrastructure from operations increases efficiency (Gomez-Ibanez and de 
Rus (2006)). In recent studies, there is a trend of non-inclusion regulatory 
and institutional dummies into the estimated production function. 
A recent study by Lan and Lin (2005) proposes various stochastic 
distance function models to carry out a two-stage performance evaluation 
for 39 railways by distinguishing the technical efficiency from the service 
effectiveness over the period from 1995-2002. The results show that the 
percentage of electrified lines, population density, per capita gross national 
income and line density are the main factors affecting railway technical 
efficiency; while per capita gross national income, population density, ratio 
of passenger train-kilometers to total train-kilometers and line density are 
the main factors affecting service effectiveness. 
In recent papers, “new” econometric techniques are used. Methods 
called True Random Effects and True Fixed Effects were developed by 
Greene (2005a, 2005b) in order to resolve the problem of firm-specific 
heterogeneity and separate inefficiency from heterogeneity. 
Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005) apply the standard SFA models 
and the True Random Effects model to the estimation of a panel of 50 Swiss 
railway companies operating over a period of 13 years. They estimate a 2-
output (passenger-km and freight ton-km, the length of network is included 
as an output characteristic) and 3-input (costs of labour, capital and energy) 
Cobb-Douglas cost frontier function. They also compare the results of 
different models (correlation between efficiency scores) and discover that the 
inefficiency estimates are substantially lower when the unobserved network 
effects are taken into account. 
Another interesting recent study (Growitsch, Wetzel (2007)) is 
dedicated to the estimation of economies of scope: if integrated railways are 
found to be more efficient, this means that they realize the economies of 
scope. Based on the sample of 54 European railways (time period covers 5 
years), the authors construct a set of virtually integrated firms and compare 
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them with those actually integrated. They apply the DEA method to a multi-
input and multi-output input distance function, both for physical and 
monetary data. The main result is that integrated companies are slightly 
more efficient, which may lead to ambiguous policy implications. 
There is practically no literature on Russia or Eastern European 
countries. Some brief reviews show that Eastern European countries are 
reforming their railways which still have very low productivity, are in very 
poor technical condition and are based on non-market principles (OECD 
(2001)). Besides, Lan and Lin (2004, 2005) incorporate into their studies some 
countries of the former USSR and of Eastern Europe, but without paying 
special attention to the institutional and regulatory circumstances. There is 
no clear study which would estimate the efficiency trends of Eastern 
European railways and discover any relationship between regulation 
(especially the transfer from the planning system to the market system) and 
efficiency.  
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Table 1: Summary of the literature review 
Paper Data Model and functional 
form 
Methodology Exogenous / environmental 
factors 
Regulatory / institutional aspects 
Perelman, 
Pestieau 
(1988) 
19 European plus 
Japanese National 
railways, postal 
services, 14 year-period 
Translog frontier 
production function 
with 2 outputs and 4 
inputs 
COLS Line-km per square km, 
percentage of electrified lines, 
track-km per line-km, average 
passenger journey and average 
length of haul ton 
No 
Oum, Yu 
(1994) 
19 OECD railways, 12 
year-period 
2 outputs, 7 inputs DEA, Tobit at 
the second 
step 
Passenger-km  per route-km, 
freight km per route-km, 
passenger train density, freight 
train density, average length of 
passenger trip, average freight 
haul, average passengers load 
per train, average freight load 
per train, share of electrified 
lines 
Managerial autonomy, ratio of subsidies 
to operating costs 
Cantos, 
Maudos 
(2001) 
16 European railways, 
21-year period 
Cost and revenue 
translog frontier 
function, 2 outputs, 3 
inputs 
SFA No Strong regulatory policy and a 
corresponding lower revenue efficiency; 
correlation of financial indicators with 
efficiency scores 
Friebel, Ivaldi, 
Vibes 
(2004) 
11 European railways, 
21-year period 
Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier 
function, 1 output, 2 
inputs plus individual 
effects and deregulation 
LISREL No Deregulation dummy covering 3 reform 
components: third-party access, 
independent regulation and separation of 
operations from infrastructure 
Lan, Lin 
(2005) 
39 worldwide railways, 
8-year period 
(1) Input distance 
function, (2) 
consumption distance 
function; (in both cases) 
SFA Gross national income per capita, 
population density, percentage 
of electrified lines, line density 
No 
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2 outputs and 3 inputs 
Farsi, 
Filippini, 
Greene 
(2005) 
50 Swiss railway 
companies, 13-year 
period 
Cost frontier function, 2 
outputs, 3 inputs 
SFA No No 
Growitsch, 
Wetzel 
(2007) 
54 European railways, 
5-year period 
Input distance function, 
1 to 3 outputs 
(depending on the firm 
type), 3 inputs 
DEA No Estimation of economies of scope 
comparing integrated vs. virtually 
integrated railways 
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3. Model specification 
To measure the efficiency level of a sample of multi-output 
railways operating in Eastern Europe and in some former Soviet 
republics we decided to apply a parametric frontier input distance 
function.1 Of course, another possibility would have been, as in 
previous studies, to estimate a multi-output cost frontier function. 
However, for the majority of the railway companies data on cost and 
input prices are not available.2  
Measuring efficiency with an input distance function implies that 
the level of efficiency is improved by reducing the quantity of inputs 
used to produce a given exogenous level of outputs. In the railway 
sector the exogeneity assumption of the outputs is supported by the fact 
that the level of the output quantity is more or less narrowly determined 
by the regulator. This argument particularly applies to several 
incumbent railway firms which still provide almost 100 percent of the 
rail transport services (Growitsch, Wetzel (2007)). 
The input distance function is defined for the input set as  
{ })()/(:max),( yLxyxd i ∈= ρρ                              (1) 
and considers by how much the input vector may be proportionally 
contracted with the output vector held fixed (see Coelli, 2002) 3; ),( yxd i  
will take a value which is greater than or equal to one if the input vector 
x  is an element of the feasible input set )( yL . In addition, 1),( =yxd i  if 
x  is located on the inner boundary of the input set.  
As in most empirical studies, we specify a translog functional form 
for the input distance function.4 For the case of M outputs and K  
inputs it is specified for the thi  firm as 
                                                 
1 For the use of parametric distance functions in the transport sector see Coelli and 
Perelman 2000. 
2 For a discussion on advantages and disadvantages of the use of distance functions see 
Coelli (2002) and Coelli and Perelman (2000). 
3 ρ represents the scalar distance, so the amount by which the input vector can be 
deflated. It is assumed that the technology satisfies the standard axioms: ),( yxd i  is 
non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and concave in x  and increasing in 
y (see the properties listed in Coelli (2002) and Färe and Primont (1995)). 
4 The Cobb Douglas form in contrast is too restrictive with regard to the elasticity of 
substitution and scale properties. 
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To obtain the frontier surface (the transformation function) one 
would set 1=IiD , so the left hand side equals zero 0ln =IiD  (see Coelli 
and Perelman (2000)). The restrictions for homogeneity of degree +1 in 
inputs and for symmetry are  
0  and  0,1
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                       (3) 
The restriction for separability between inputs and outputs is 
fulfilled when 0=kmδ . A convenient approach of imposing 
homogeneity constraints is to follow Coelli and Perelman (2000) 
considering that homogeneity implies that for any 0>w  
),(),( yxwdywxd ii =                            (4) 
Therefore, one of the inputs might be arbitrarily chosen, such as 
the thK  input and set KXw /1= . Then one obtains  
KiKi XyxdyXxd /),(),/( =                  (5) 
For the specification of the model used in this study we considered 
railway companies characterized by a production process with three 
inputs - labor, network length and number of wagons - and two outputs 
- ton-kilometers and passenger-kilometers  provided. 
 By dividing the equation (2) by an input and rearranging we 
defined the following input frontier translog distance function:  
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Where xW is the wagon measure; yP and yT are the numbers of 
passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers respectively provided by the 
companies. Following the methodology attributed to Oum and 
Yu (1994), we decided to assume two pure supply oriented measures of 
the output. xL is the indicator of labor input, xN is the indicator of the 
capital input (network length in kilometers). T is a time variable which 
captures the shift in technology representing change in technical 
efficiency. Replacing the distance term  - IDln  with a composed error 
term vit - uit we obtain the standard stochastic frontier approach 
proposed by Aigner et al. (1977)5.  The standard random error term vit  
is assumed to be distributed independent of uit as i.i.d N(0, σ2v ), 
whereas for the non-negative technical inefficiency term uit, we assume 
a half-normal distribution N+(0, σ2u ). A radial input-oriented measure 
of technical efficiency is than obtained by  )exp(1 itI
i
u
d
TE −== . 
 
4. Data and econometric specification 
The study is based on a panel data set for a sample of railway 
companies operating in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet 
republics over the period from 1991-2007.  Due to lack of data we were 
obliged to exclude from the sample some small railway companies  
recently created in several countries.6 
                                                 
5 For estimation purposes, the negative sign on the dependent variable can be ignored. 
This results in the signs of the estimated coefficient being reversed. 
6 For instance, in Poland in 2007, the independent freight operators transported only 5% 
of total tons of freight. In Russia in 2007, the recently created freight company, First 
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The data set used in the empirical part of this study includes 28 
railways operating in the following 26 countries: Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary (2 companies), 
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (2 companies). The empirical analysis is performed 
with an unbalanced panel data set composed of 28 railway companies 
observed over 17 years, with a total number of observations of 368. 
In most cases, the railway companies are historically preserved 
natural monopolies. In some countries, as already mentioned, there are 
small independent operators. For two countries we included in the data 
set 2 major railway companies. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the railway system is dominated by two companies, the Railways of 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ZFBiH) and the Republika 
Srpska Railways (ZRS). In the case of Hungary, the railway system is 
characterized by two main companies, MAV and GYSEV. However, 
MAV is larger and more important than GYSEV which covers only a 
limited territory.  
The railway companies considered in this study are quite 
heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is due to different environmental, 
topographical, technological and regulatory factors as well as different 
institutional frameworks. Nevertheless, the common characteristic of 
these companies is that they operate in countries that were under Soviet 
influence or control. The use of the panel data stochastic frontier 
approach, should, however, help to reduce the problems related to 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
All companies included in the sample are multi-output 
companies which provide two services: freight and passenger 
transportations. Of course, the share of freight transport is generally 
higher than the share of the passenger transport because most of the 
railways under investigation are dependent on high volumes of bulk 
freight such as oil, coal and metals. 
The data are taken from the annual reports of the UIC (Union 
Internationale des Chemins de Fer), from the data published by the 
World Bank Railways Database and from the web site of Eurostat. 
                                                                                                                       
Freight Company, was responsible for the transport of only 1,5% of total freight 
volumes. 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics 
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From the econometric specification point of view, we should 
consider using stochastic frontier models for panel data. The first use of 
panel data models in stochastic frontier models goes back to Pitt and 
Lee (1981) who interpreted the panel data random effects as inefficiency 
rather than heterogeneity. Pitt and Lee (1981)’s model is different from 
the conventional RE model in that the individual specific effects are 
assumed to follow a half-normal distribution7. A major shortcoming of 
these models is that any unobserved, time-invariant, firm-specific 
heterogeneity is considered as inefficiency. In order to solve this 
problem using panel data, Greene (2005a,b) proposed to extend the SFA 
model in its original form (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977)) by 
adding a fixed or random individual effect in the model and/or by 
allowing some coefficients to be random.8 The main model used in this 
paper is the random parameters (RP) stochastic frontier model proposed 
                                                 
7 Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Battese and Coelli (1992) presented variations of this 
model. 
8 For a successful application of these models in network industries see Farsi, Filippini 
and Kuenzle (2006) and Farsi, Filippini and Greene (2005). 
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Greene (2005b)9. In this model the two output coefficients and the 
intercept are assumed to be random variables.  
The translog model is formulated in the following way:  
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(7) 
This model treats firm-specific random effects (αi) and time-
varying inefficiency (uit) separately and is therefore able to distinguish 
between the unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency. In this way it 
tries to overcome some limitations of the conventional panel data 
models. Moreover, in model (7) the first-order coefficients of the outputs 
are considered random. Therefore, in this model the two output 
coefficients and the intercept are assumed to be random variables with a 
normal distribution across companies.  
The variation of the two output coefficients should capture part of 
the correlation of the random intercept with the corresponding 
variables. Therefore, within this framework we first allow firms to have 
different underlying production technologies with different scale 
economies, caused by unobserved differences in technological 
conditions and sizes.  
For comparison purposes, we also estimated another model based 
on the original cost frontier model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). A 
summary of the two models used in the paper is given in Table 3. 
Model I is a pooled frontier model in that the sample is considered a 
cross-section and its panel aspect is neglected. The random error term is 
divided into two components: a normal error term vit capturing the 
noise and a half-normal random term uit representing the inefficiency as 
a one-sided non-negative disturbance. The firm’s inefficiency is 
                                                 
9 Although similar extensions have been proposed by several previous authors, Greene 
(2005a, b) provides effective numerical solutions. For similar models see in particular 
Kumbhakar (1991) and Polachek and Yoon (1996). 
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estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term 
E it it itu u v +  , proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982). 
Model II is the extension of model I that include an additional 
firm-specific effect (αi) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms and the two first-order coefficients of the outputs are 
random. In this model which is a random coefficients (RC) version of 
the true random effects (TRE) frontier model, it is assumed that the 
unobserved cost differences across firms that remain constant over time, 
are driven by network-related unobserved characteristics rather than 
inefficiency. Given the relatively long period covered in the data (up to 
17 years), this is a realistic assumption. The inefficiency term is assumed 
to be an iid random variable with half-normal distribution.  
Table 3: Econometric specification of the models employed 
Model Firm-specific 
component  
Random error 
εit 
Inefficiency 
uit 
 
Model I 
Pooled (ML) 
 
None 
ititit uv +=ε  
),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+  
),0(iid~ 2vit Nv σ  
)( itituE ε  
 
Model II 
RC version of 
the TRE (ML) 
 
 
Random (group 
dummies αi) 
ititit uv +=ε  
),0(iid~ 2uit Nu σ+  
),0(iid~ 2vit Nv σ  
)( itituE ε  
 
5. Estimation results 
The estimation results of the translog distance function frontier 
obtained by the two different models are given in Table 4. Given that all 
the variables are in logarithmic form, these coefficients can be directly 
interpreted as elasticities. For the interpretation of the empirical 
estimates of a distance function it is important to keep in mind, as 
pointed out by Färe and Primont (1995), the duality between the cost 
and the input distance functions. For instance, the derivative of a 
translog input distance function with respect to a particular input is 
equal to the cost share of that input. This means that the expected signs 
of the coefficients of the inputs should be positive. Moreover, the 
elasticity of a translog input distance function with respect to any 
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output is equal to the negative value of the cost elasticity of that output. 
This means that the signs of the coefficients of the outputs should be 
negative. 
The estimated coefficients of the first-order terms have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant across all models. 
Generally, the values of the coefficients of the Pooled model differ from 
those of the random coefficients version of the True RE model. 
Table 4: Estimated coefficients (p-values in parentheses) 
  
Pooled 
 
 RC version of the TRE 
 
αYT -0.104 
(0.0000) 
-0.019 
(0.0581) 
αYP -0.501 
(0.0000) 
-0.163 
(0.0000) 
αYTYT -0.030 
(0.0907) 
0.002 
(0.7710) 
αYPYP -0.173 
(0.0000) 
-0.111 
(0.0000) 
αYTYP 0.059 
(0.0034) 
-0.007 
(0.3299) 
αXL 0.272 
(0.0001) 
0.216 
(0.0000) 
αXN 0.694 
(0.0000) 
0.596 
(0.0000) 
αXLXL 0.690 
(0.0105) 
0.242 
(0.0043) 
αXNXN -0.133 
(0.5333) 
0.359 
(0.0000) 
αXLXN -0.141 
(0.5143) 
-0.222 
(0.0040) 
αYTXL -0.357 
(0.0000) 
-0.127 
(0.0000) 
αYTXN 0.185 
(0.0008) 
0.094 
(0.0000) 
αYPXL 0.410 
(0.0000) 
0.122 
(0.0000) 
αYPXN -0.267 
(0.0000) 
-0.091 
(0.0000) 
αT -0.002 
(0.5906) 
0.012 
(0.0000) 
Constant 0.268 
(0.0000) 
-0.023 
(0.2395) 
Sigma 0.315 
(0.000) 
0.094 
(0.000) 
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Lamda 1.215 
(0.000) 
1.332 
(0.000) 
   
Standard Deviation for 
random parameters (a) 
  
Costant  0.25 
(0.000) 
Tyln   0.06 
(0.000) 
Pyln
 
 0.576 
(0.000) 
The coefficients of first-order output variables represent the cost 
elasticities with respect to the corresponding outputs at the sample 
median. The sum of the coefficients of the two output variables is 
approximately 0.6 for Model I and 0.18 for Model II. This result suggests 
the presence of economies of scale, because, ceteris paribus, by 
increasing both outputs by 10 percent, the total costs will increase less 
than 10%. Moreover, a glance at the results in the right hand column of 
the table (and in particular at the random parameters) indicates that 
there is considerable variation across railways in the impacts of both 
outputs on costs. This result underlines the importance of the use of a 
random coefficients model in this context characterized by a high 
degree of heterogeneity of the railway companies considered in this 
study. 
The elasticity of the input distance function with respect to time 
reflects the elasticity of cost reduction and provides a dual measure of 
the speed of technical change. This coefficient is positive (and 
significant) only in the RP model. This result indicates the presence of 
neutral technological progress. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the cost inefficiency 
estimates of the railway companies obtained from Models I – II. We can 
observe some notable differences in the estimated cost inefficiency 
levels. By employing the pooled stochastic frontier model (Model I), the 
average efficiency is estimated to be 83%. By contrast, the average 
efficiency based on the random coefficients model (Model II) is 
estimated to be 94%. Moreover, the standard deviation of efficiency 
scores is much lower in this model than in the pooled model. Higher 
efficiency levels in comparison to Model I are expected since the 
random coefficients model is able to distinguish unobserved firm-
specific effects from inefficiency and thus is able to treat the two effects 
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separately. We therefore believe that the results obtained by the RC 
model can be regarded as a good approximation of the general picture 
of the actual efficiency of Eastern European and Former Soviet 
Railways. 
Table 5: Technical efficiency scores 
 Pooled 
RC version of 
the TRE 
min 0.55 0.76 
max 0.94 0.99 
average 0.83 0.94 
median 0.84 0.95 
st.dev. 0.07 0.03 
Table 6 presents the average efficiency score for every railway 
over the period considered in the analysis. 
Table 6: Average technical efficiency scores over time 
 Pooled RC version of 
the TRE 
Russia 0.833 0.917 
Ukraine 0.882 0.943 
Belarus 0.906 0.938 
Moldova 0.864 0.955 
Georgia 0.801 0.949 
Armenia 0.722 0.939 
Azerbaijan 0.711 0.943 
Uzbekistan 0.722 0.937 
Tajikistan 0.894 0.923 
Turkmenistan 0.847 0.940 
Kazakhstan 0.791 0.950 
Kirghizstan 0.893 0.953 
Latvia 0.862 0.951 
Lithuania 0.845 0.943 
Estonia 0.881 0.933 
Czech Republic 0.776 0.949 
Slovak Republic 0.808 0.951 
Hungary GYSEV 0.866 0.941 
Hungary MAV 0.825 0.940 
Poland 0.788 0.936 
Bulgaria 0.810 0.940 
Romania 0.861 0.942 
Albania 0.840 0.937 
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Macedonia 0.822 0.947 
Croatia 0.763 0.942 
Slovenia 0.901 0.946 
Bosnia-Herzegovina ZBH 0.719 0.952 
Bosnia-Herzegovina ZRS 0.838 0.949 
 
6. Statistical testing 
In the following, we conduct some statistical tests on the 
differences of efficiency levels among regions and among public 
companies with different institutional forms. To test these differences 
we adopt a Kruskal-Wallis rank test10. The test checks the null 
hypothesis that p samples do not differ and is based on the ranking of 
data (efficiency scores in our case). However, the test does not 
encompass the panel structure of the data: either it should be taken as a 
pool or average efficiency scores for any firm (in case of time-varying 
efficiency) must be calculated11. 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test on the differences in 
inefficiency scores between different groups are given in the Table 7. 
Most of the results do not indicate any significant difference in the level 
of efficiency between companies operating in different geopolitical 
regions and between companies operating with different institutional 
forms.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test is applied to both models (pooled and 
the RC version of the TRE). The significance of the test is evaluated on 
the 5% significance level. 
 
                                                 
10 There are two other alternative approaches that can be used to analyze the impact of 
the geopolitical and institutional factors on the level of efficiency. One aims at 
estimating the distance function including some dummies for the geopolitical and 
institutional forms. This method is free from the estimation errors incurred in the 
inefficiency estimates. These random errors may mask the transition between 
subsamples, thus may result in under-rejection (too few rejections) of the null 
hypothesis of similar cost-efficiencies across different types. The second assumes that 
these factors directly influence the degree of technical inefficiency, e.g. influence directly 
the inefficiency term. Our analysis (not reported in the paper) shows that both 
approaches lead to similar results obtained with the Kruskal-Wallis approach.  
11 Some applications of the Kruskal-Wallis test can be found, for example, in Singh, 
Coelli and Fleming (2001) and Farsi and Filippini (2004). 
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Table 7: Kruskal-Wallis test statistics 
    
Model I 
 
Model II 
Independent state-
owned public 
company 
(288 observations) 
vs 
Administrative units 
(80 observations) 
0,059 0,043 
Former Soviet 
republics railway  
companies 
(172 observations) 
vs 
Companies of 
Eastern Europe (196 
observations) 
6,975* 0,018 
-  * statistically significant at 5% significance level.  
-  The statistics have a Chi-square distribution with one degree of 
freedom. 
-  The number of observations in each group is given in parantheses.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper a translog inputs-outputs distance frontier function 
has been estimated for a panel of 28 railways companies operating in 
Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet republics over the period from 
1991-2007. These railway companies are characterized by a high degree 
of heterogeneity in environmental and network characteristics. The 
efficiency estimates largely depend upon how the unobserved 
heterogeneity across companies is taken into account by the econometric 
model. For this purpose we have considered the estimation of two 
translog frontier input distance models. The first frontier model is based 
on the original production frontier model proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977). The second model is a random coefficients frontier 
model proposed by Greene (2005b) that includes an additional firm-
specific effect (αi) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity among 
companies. This model has proved to be able to solve, at least partially, 
the unobserved heterogeneity problem in measuring the technical 
efficiency. The random coefficients frontier model provides reasonable 
efficiency estimates. The results of this model suggest that the median 
value of the technical efficiency is relatively high at 94%. It should be 
noted that the random coefficients frontier model’s estimates do not 
include any persistent inefficiencies that might remain more or less 
constant over time. To the extent that there are certain sources of 
inefficiency that result in time-invariant excess costs, the estimates of 
this model should provide a reasonable lower bound for the companies’ 
efficiencies. Finally, most of the results do not indicate any significant 
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difference in the level of efficiency between companies operating in 
different geopolitical regions and between companies operating with 
different institutional forms. 
The latter result suggests that the reforms of the railway sectors 
introduced in several eastern European countries and in several former 
Soviet Union republics have not yet been as effective as expected. The 
reasons could be the following. First, in several countries we are still at 
the initial stage of reform. This implies that not all changes have been 
put in place. Second, the change from a command economy system to a 
market economy system not only requires a change of the institutions 
but also a change in the management culture. In several of these 
countries the political influence on the governance of the railway 
companies remains strong. It seems that in order to be effective a change 
in the institutional form of the railway companies should also be 
accompanied by a cultural change of the role of the politics in the 
management of these companies. Recent political conflicts between 
Russia and Estonia and the war between Russia and Georgia have 
demonstrated the vulnerability of railway operations to political 
decisions.  
Finally, the similarity regarding the levels of efficiency of 
companies operating in different geopolitical regions could be explained 
by the fact that these countries form a unique economic space and are all 
economies in transition.   
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Governance Choice in Railways: Applying Empirical Transaction 
Costs Economics to the Railways of Easter Europe and Former USSR 
Nadezda Negovelova 
 
Abstract 
The performance of railways depends not only on technical 
parameters, but also on the organizational form of the railway: vertical 
integration or separation of operations from infrastructure management. 
Vertical separation was one of the main reforms implemented on 
Western European railways whose experience was transferred, some 
years later, to Eastern European and former Soviet railways. In this 
paper, transaction costs economics (TCE) is applied to analyze 
governance decisions of railway authorities of the former communist 
camp countries. The impact of transactions characteristics – frequency, 
uncertainty and assets specificity – in taken into account as well. We 
apply the Heckman method to an unbalanced panel which covers 28 
railways and a period of 12 years. Our results show that vertically 
integrated railways perform better, and the role of transactions 
characteristics corresponds to TCE predictions. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Western European railway reform experience of the early 
nineties have been transferred, some years later, to the railways of 
former communist camp countries – members of the former USSR and 
Eastern European countries. However, the evidence of the reform 
success (in terms of railway performance) is still not obvious even in the 
EU member countries, and there could be serious doubts whether the 
application of the same reform measures will not deteriorate railways 
performance in countries of the Eastern Europe and the former USSR. 
One of the most important reform measures (however, according 
to EU legislation, not compulsory in its extreme, complete form) was the 
vertical separation of operations from infrastructure management, i.e. 
the change of governance and organizational form. The governance 
decision – to remain integrated or to separate12 – can be evaluated in 
                                                 
12 We can distinguish 3 types of separation: (1) accounting separation, when the 
activities remain within the same company, but have separated accounts, (2) legal 
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several ways. We may estimate the impact of governance form on 
railways efficiency (e.g. Growitsch and Wetzel (2007)), we can try to 
analyze customers’ satisfaction or contractual relationships by 
interviews (e.g. Palay (1984)), or we may use empirical transaction costs 
economics approach (TCE). The latter was rarely applied empirically to 
railways13 and never to Eastern European railways. 
In this paper, we analyze the organizational form decision, or 
governance form decision in railways, using the transaction costs 
economics approach. Following Williamson, the governance form is 
determined by the environment, or transactions characteristics – 
frequency of transactions, uncertainty and assets specificity. We apply 
so called first generation empirical tests which simply analyze the 
governance strategy choice, and second generation tests which account 
for the expected performance. 
The goal of the paper is to illustrate how the governance 
decision in Eastern European and former Soviet railways was 
determined by transactions environment and to observe performance 
implications of the strategy choice in the framework of transaction costs 
economics. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, a brief literature review 
of empirical TCE is done. Then, in the third section, the theoretical basis 
of TCE is presented. The fourth section contains the methodology of 
empirical analysis in the TCE. The fifth section explains how and why 
TCE may illustrate governance choices in railways. In the sixth section, 
we proceed with the empirical analysis applied to the data on Eastern 
European and former Soviet railways. The final section concludes.  
 
2. Review of literature 
Transaction costs economics (TCE) goes back to the Coase’s 
work “The Nature of Firm” (1937), where he argued that the 
neoclassical picture was incomplete and not able to explain two basic 
                                                                                                                       
separation, when activities are executed by separated commercial entities, and (3) 
ownership separation, when activities are executed by separated commercial entities 
which have different owners (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994)) In the present 
paper we deal with the stronger form of vertical separation, i.e. legal and ownership 
separation (the latter took place only in one case). 
13 Mainly by Yvrande-Billon; see next section for details 
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questions: i) the existence of firms and ii) the determinants of firm size. 
He investigates why the firm emerges and emphasizes the existence of 
transaction costs. 
For about 40 years Coase’s work attracted little attention, but 
with the development of the New Institutional Economics during the 
1960s and 1970s with works of Williamson, Alchian and other 
economists, it became one of the most cited articles. One important 
question which has not been answered by Coase (1937) is: what is the 
source of transaction costs and contractual difficulties. This issue has 
been addressed by many theoretical contributions in the late 1970s and 
1980s. One of the most influential authors undoubtedly is Oliver 
Williamson, who developed huge parts of the transaction cost theory. 
Williamson (1971) criticizes the traditional simplified view that 
under perfect competition market exchange does not cause any costs 
and asks “if the costs of operating competitive markets are zero, why 
integrate?” He defines the “organizational failures framework” on 
which further discussions of transaction costs are based upon. He 
argues that environmental as well as human factors determine the costs 
of using the market or internal organization. He developed the 
transaction cost model (1991, 1996) where transaction costs functionally 
depend on three variables: the frequency of transactions, the uncertainty 
surrounding their organization, and the degree of specificity in the 
investments involved. 
Williamson describes TCE as “an empirical success story” 
(Williamson (1996)). However, even though there exist about 1000 
empirical studies analyzing the make-or-buy or contracting decisions, 
most of them present econometric results which leave open the door for 
alternative interpretations, i.e. confirming hypotheses of competing 
theories – resource-based view, incentive theory, incomplete contract 
theory (see Hamilton and Nickerson (2003)). TCE provides a discussion 
of the sources of transaction costs and derives propositions; econometric 
tests however are not conclusive. Furthermore, we get no information 
about the impact of contractual choices on performance. 
In the empirical TCE, a common instrument are so called 
indirect tests which examine only the differential effect which tells us 
about the impact of transaction characteristics on the change of 
probability that one or another governance form will be chosen (see 
section 4 for more details) and where transaction costs are assumed to 
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be minimized. However, there are two interesting papers estimating 
structural form models instead of reduced form models. 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991) investigate organizational 
choice in the US naval shipbuilding industry. They collected data by 
interviewing company officials. They tried to estimate directly the costs 
of organization (transaction costs) using data on the number of hours 
managers spend for the treatment of a particular component. They 
apply a two-stage Heckman method. Their results are consistent with 
some but not all TCE statements. Temporal specificity is found to be 
crucially important for organizational form decision. They also found 
that “The correlation between human capital specificity and the 
likelihood of integration […] is a consequence of a decrease in internal 
organization costs rather than the increase in the costs of market 
exchange” which contradicts the TCE predictions while supporting the 
resource based view of the firm. 
Poppo and Zenger (1998) investigate organizational choice of 
information services. They measure performance, rather than 
governance costs, also by interviewing top executives, in the form of a 
qualitative measure and try to reveal directly the interdependence 
between performance and “exchange attributes” (transaction 
characteristics, in terms of Williamson). Several hypotheses are deduced 
taking into account competing theories of the firm (e.g. TCE, RBV, 
incentive theory). Estimation results of a maximum likelihood Heckman 
model support TCE hypotheses instead of the RBV concerning the 
influence of specificity (may be due to the high technological 
uncertainty, which makes rigid internal routines inefficient) amongst 
other results. 
There are very few works applying TCE to the railway sector. 
Pittman (1991) investigates contracts of rail sidetrack construction and 
the break of these contracts on the sample of the US railroads. The 
contracts contain information about which party, railroad or shipper, 
pays (or furnishes) for any part of the construction. Pittman emphasizes 
the problem of contract uniformity, specific investment and 
opportunism (principal-agent problem and bargaining problem, both 
affecting the railroad more than the shipper). He concludes that “in the 
presence of sunk, relationship-specific investments, the form of the 
contractual relationship between the parties makes a difference in terms 
of future behavior”. The paper doesn’t contain any empirical work. 
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One of rare studies applying the TCE to railways is the analysis 
of contracts between rail freight carriers and their shippers by 
Palay (1984). He states that, “as investment characteristics become more 
transaction specific, the associated institutional structure becomes 
increasingly unique to the parties and transactions it supports”. The 
paper doesn’t contain empirical econometric analysis, but it is an 
important early example of application of the TCE to the railway sector. 
Menard and Yvrande-Billon (2005) analyze the British rail 
reform. They use rather detailed technical data on assets specificity 
(types of fleet units) and redeployability, but they don’t apply any 
sophisticated econometric technique. They discover that transaction 
costs influence the organizational choice. They also find that “The 
British experience of railways’ reform illustrates that if the degree of 
specificity of assets has a direct impact on the choice of a governance 
structure, as substantiated by so many tests in transaction cost 
economics, the choice of an organizational arrangement reciprocally 
influences the nature and characteristics of investments made”. 
The present work differs from the literature described above and 
its achievements. The methodology of empirical TCE, previously 
applied to other industries, will now be applied to railways with the 
purpose of supporting or rejecting the issues developed by railway 
economists: among others, while citing Coase, Pittman didn’t formalize 
the TCE statements and didn’t check them empirically. Actually, no 
comprehensive detailed empirical TCE studies were done in railway 
sector. The present paper will partially fill this gap applying empirical 
TCE to the data on Eastern European and former Soviet railways. 
 
3. Theoretical background 
Transaction costs economics are based on the assumption that 
there is a cost of using the price mechanism (market) and that there is 
also a cost of internal organization. The choice of a certain governance 
form (i.e. market, hybrid, or hierarchy) is made on a comparison of the 
respective sum of production and transaction costs. In a world without 
any transaction costs, organizational choice does not matter. 
Oliver Williamson formalized TCE focusing on transaction 
attributes (i.e. frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity) which 
determine transaction costs of an organizational form. Frequency has 
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ambiguous effects on contractual choices (Crocker and Masten (1996)): 
on the one hand, a high frequency may support the setup costs of 
specialized governance; on the other hand, it has better reputation effect 
properties that limit the interest of such a specialized governance 
structure (Williamson (1999)). A higher uncertainty usually brings the 
transaction inside the firm because market relationships are not 
guaranteed. Assets specificity refers to the degree to which a durable 
asset can be redeployed to alternative uses or to alternative users 
without sacrifice of productive value; higher assets specificity leads to 
higher transaction costs of market interaction, i.e. integration becomes 
more attractive. 
Summarizing, the assets specificity increases transaction costs of 
the “buy” decision and correspondingly increases the probability to 
integrate; the same is true for uncertainty: a higher uncertainty leads to 
integration rather separation. As for frequency, the theory doesn’t 
predict its clear impact on the governance form in terms of separation or 
integration. 
Depending on the combination of uncertainty, frequency and 
assets specificity, the manager chooses the organizational form which 
optimizes expected benefits, i.e. minimizes costs – production costs as 
well as transaction costs affected by the transaction characteristics. 
There exist two pole organizational forms (market and hierarchy). On 
anonymous spot markets the price reflects the value of the good. Spot 
markets have the advantage that firms get to specialize in doing what 
they do best; innovation is generated by numerous sources. The 
opposite pole of governance is vertical integration. Vertical integration 
enables efficient responses to changing environments where 
coordinated adaptation is necessary. Organizing transactions within a 
hierarchy is efficient, if specialized investments have to be realized and 
contracts would be unavoidably incomplete. Between the two poles 
hybrid forms of governance, like complex contracts or partial ownership 
arrangements, are possible. 
When testing the governance hypotheses, it is often left aside 
that management decisions are endogenous to their expected 
performance implications and not simply depend on transaction 
characteristics. Managers will usually choose a strategy for which they 
expect the highest performance resulting in the so called “self-selection 
bias”. Here, the empirical TCE distinguishes between “first generation 
empirical tests” and “second generation empirical tests”, the latter 
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attempt to correct this bias. In the next section, these two types of 
empirical tests are presented in details. 
 
4. Methodological basis 
The ‘traditional’ empirical approach in TCE, or the first 
generation tests, consists in evaluating the probability that contracting 
(market) will be chosen over alternative governance form (integrated 
firm) and then investigating whether the evidence is consistent with 
TCE predictions regarding, for instance, the benefits of long term 
contracting in the presence of relationship-specific investments (Masten 
and Saussier (2002)). Therefore, the usual econometric tests of the TCE 
propositions are indirect. They show that contractual choices 
correspond to what the theory advocates and then infer from this result 
that these choices are efficient (that transaction costs are minimized). 
But they rarely investigate “how much we lose by going from the best to 
the next best [contractual arrangement]” (Joskow (1991)). 
In order to overcome the problem of indirect tests of reduced 
form models predicting only differential effects, it is necessary to relate 
performance values (mirroring transaction costs) directly to 
organizational choices. “Second generation” empirical works not only 
test the TCE hypothesis according to which firms’ organizational 
choices depend on the features of their transactional environment, what 
we call the “first order hypothesis” of TCE, but also investigate whether 
deviation from TCE principles (i.e. choosing not the best strategy given 
certain transaction characteristics) leads to poorer performance, what 
we call the “misalignment hypothesis”. These tests account for expected 
performance of the organizational form and for endogeneity between 
transaction characteristics, strategy choice and expected performance. 
Putting it more formally, in the first generation empirical tests, in 
the most general form, the decision to choose a governance structure 
(firm vs. contracting on the market) represents a standard discrete 
choice problem. Transactors will choose one governance structure if the 
expected gains (net of transaction costs) from doing so are greater than 
those of organizing the transaction in some other way. The first 
generation of empirical tests – which have been employed in several 
hundreds of empirical studies – is based on indirect tests formulating 
the (often make-or-buy) decision as a dichotomous choice variable: 
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where G* represents the chosen organizational form – CS  may 
represent contracting, AS  an alternative, and ipi  is the transactor’s 
expected performance under the respective organizational form. To test 
such a theory, one has to relate the expected values (i.e. benefits and 
costs) of alternative organizational arrangements to observable 
transaction attributes, which can be expressed in the form of a vector X. 
Hence, 
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with 
ie being stochastic disturbances reflecting omitted variables 
or decision maker misperceptions about the true values of ipi . For 
simplicity we might assume linear relationships with CCC X εβpi +=  
and AAA X εβpi +=  and we can define the probability that a certain 
contracting decision CS  is chosen: 
))(Pr()Pr()*Pr( XSS CACAACC ββεεpipi −<−=>==  
This means that for cases where the effect on the expected value 
of a transaction organized under governance mode “C” (beta) is larger 
than the expected value under the alternative governance mode “A” 
(alpha), the likelihood that we will observe “C” is higher. First 
generation empirical tests predict this differential effect (beta minus 
alpha) by applying qualitative economic models (e.g. probit or logit 
estimations with the chosen governance form as exogenous variable) 
and in fact can say nothing about the respective signs of these two 
coefficients. Here, we assume that transaction costs are minimized – the 
firm behaves optimally from the TCE perspective. Such binary choice 
models calculate coefficients in the form of (βC − βA)/σ with σ² being the 
variance of the difference of the error terms iε . 
“Second generation” empirical works try to answer a more 
precise, from a governance choice perspective, question: “How does the 
performance of a firm that adopted a particular organizational 
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arrangement compare with how that same firm would have performed 
had it adopted an alternative?” 
As before, let’s represent a binary organizational strategy set 
( CS , AS ) corresponding to the “make or buy” issue and the respective 
performance outcome ( Cpi , Api ). Let’s also suppose we observe 
( CS , Cpi ) and ( AS , Api ). We would like to estimate what their 
performance might have been choosing another strategy and what is the 
impact of a set of exogenous variables X. That is, we want to check 
whether the strategy choice is “mistaken”, taking into consideration the 
performance which could be obtained given certain transaction 
attributes. 
We want to estimate, as before, the following equations:  
CCC X εβpi +=  and AAA X εβpi += . 
These equations may be estimated by OLS, using the sub-
samples of firms choosing both strategies only to the extent that all 
exogenous relevant variables are well known by the econometrician and 
that the set of observations is a random sample of all observations.  
Nevertheless, it is usual to suppose the existence of unobservable 
variables that affect performance outcomes and that are also correlated 
with the organizational choice. And it can be obviously assumed that a 
firm that chose organizational choice CS  may differ from a randomly 
selected firm in the population of firms; we call it “self-selection bias”. 
Following Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), the estimation approach 
depends on whether such unobservable variables exist and whether 
organizational choices are endogenous or not. If all variables that affect 
both performance and organizational choices are not known or 
organizational choices are not exogenous, then, using OLS could lead to 
a potential endogeneity problem. Here, we need to control for such 
endogenity using sophisticated econometric techniques like the 
Heckman procedures (see Hamilton and Nickerson (2003)). Such 
procedure allows to account for the impact of the transaction 
characteristics on performance (on the market or in the firm) while 
simultaneously correcting for the sample bias in the estimates. 
Applying the Heckman procedure enables us to estimate the 
parameter values of the structural form model (i.e. alpha and beta) as 
well as to account for the endogeneity of organizational choice due to 
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self selection. At the first step, a reduced form of the organizational 
choice model is estimated (so called selection equation) and inverse 
Mills ratios are constructed. At the second step, performance equations 
including the inverse Mills ratio as an additional regressor are estimated 
using OLS. Hence, given that performance is not a strictly exogenous 
variable and we will have trouble with error terms which are not i.i.d. 
anymore, we have to construct the inverse Mills ratio for correction. 
The Mills ratio is used to correct the error terms when the 
dependent variable (strategy choice) is a binary variable and the 
performance is not exogenous. It is argued that there occurs a certain 
“self-selection” into the strategy, where the manager expects the higher 
performance – like the example of a fisher and a hunter: the hunter 
becomes a hunter because he knows that he is better in hunting than in 
fishing. And this is exactly the same for a firm’s decision on strategy 
choice (e.g. vertical integration or separation decision).  
The inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio leads to expected values 
of the error terms equaling zero by construction; OLS estimation will 
result in unbiased estimates of all parameters (i.e. coefficients and 
sigmas). The parameter estimates of the inverse Mills ratio also have an 
interesting interpretation; one can discover whether positive or negative 
selection into the respective strategies takes place and may detect 
situations of comparative advantage with firms having above average 
performance in their chosen strategy/form of organization. We could 
compare the performance directly if we could observe performance of 
the same railway at the same time using different strategies, i.e. 
AitCit pipi −=∆ , S={A,C}. However, it’s never possible because each 
productive entity applies only one strategy at a given period t. 
How to construct Mills ratio? This issue is addressed by 
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003). 
First, given that we have a binary variable for strategy choice, i.e. 
a kind of limited dependent variable, we model it as a continuous latent 
variable *iS , implying that 1S  is chosen if 
*
iS  passes a certain threshold, 
while 0S  is chosen if it doesn’t. If both strategy choice and performance 
are continuous variables, this can be done with the use of other 
econometric methods, including instrumental variables, two-stage least 
squares, three-stage least squares (or simultaneous equations 
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techniques) which allow to model simultaneously numerous economic 
relationships. 
Let’s suppose that the strategy choice is a function of 3 factors: 
(1) the expected net benefit, what we call “performance,” of 
implementing strategy 1S  versus 0S , (2) covariates iZ  representing 
factors that affect strategy choice but don’t affect outcome performance 
directly, (3) iϑ  which represents unobserved factors influencing the 
choice. Therefore the strategy choice is defined as: 
iiiii ZS ϑδpipiγ ++−= )( 01*  
where 1=iS  if 0
* >iS ; 0=iS  if 0
* ≤iS . 
The parameter γ  measures the extent to which the effect of 
strategy on profit directly influences strategy choice. Of course, the 
problem in estimating this equation is that i1pi  and i0pi  are not observed 
for each firm simultaneously. Knowing that iii X 111 εβpi +=  and 
iii X 000 εβpi += , we come to the reduced form model of strategy choice: 
iiiiiii ZXXS ϑεεγδββγ +−++−= )()( 0101* , or 
iiii ZXS θδβ ++=*  
where iiii ϑεεγθ +−= )( 01  and )( 01 ββγβ −= . 
Heckman and Lee assumed that i1ε , i0ε  and iϑ  are jointly 
normally distributed so that expressions for )|( 11 SE iε  and )|( 00 SE iε  
are tractable. Endogeneity arises if 01 ≠uσ  or 00 ≠uσ . 
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The model assumes that 010 =σ  as well, which implies that 
unobservables for i1pi  are uncorrelated with unobservables for i0pi , 
because i1pi  and i0pi  cannot be simultaneously observed for firm i in 
cross-sectional data (neither in panel data if we assume that a firm 
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applies only one strategy at one period of time). Exogenous treatment 
arises if 001 == uu σσ . 
Under these assumptions, the expected value of the error term 
when choosing 1S , conditional on choosing strategy 1S , may be written 
as: 
iuiiiiu
ii
ZXZX
SESE
111
111
][/][
)0*|()|(
λσδβδβφσ
εε
−=+Φ+−=
=>=
, 
where ф[.] is the normal density and Ф[.] is the cumulative 
normal distribution. The term [.]/[.] Φ= φλ  is called the inverse Mills 
ratio. Similarly, the expected value of the error term when choosing 0S , 
conditional on choosing strategy 0S , is: 
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If strategy choice is exogenous, so that 001 == uu σσ , then the 
expected values of error terms are zero, and our estimations of the 
treatment effect are not biased. If strategy choice in endogenous, we 
must construct the inverse Mills ratios, which is problematic because β 
and δ are unknown. Fortunately, we can recover estimates of β and δ by 
estimating the reduced-form strategy choice equation via a probit 
regression. Having obtained these corrected estimates, sample selection-
corrected performance equations can be estimated using OLS: 
iiiiiuii eZXZXX 1111 ]ˆˆ[/]ˆˆ[ ++Φ+−= δβδβφσβpi  
iiiiiuii eZXZXX 0000 ])ˆˆ[1/(]ˆˆ[ ++Φ−++= δβδβφσβpi  
These equations together with 
iiiiiii ZXXS ϑεεγδββγ +−++−= )()( 0101*  are called “switching 
regression model” in labor econometrics. By construction, the expected 
values of the error terms ie1  and ie0  (conditional on Xi) are both zero 
due to the inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio terms, so that OLS 
estimation yields unbiased estimates of all β and δ. Before adding the 
Mills ratio, error terms were correlated with regressors Xi, and 
estimations of β were biased. Introducing an additional term into the 
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regression, the Mills ratio, we eliminated correlation of error terms with 
regressors. That is, our estimation approach proceeds in two steps. First, 
we estimate the reduced form strategy choice equation via probit and 
construct the inverse Mills ratio terms. Second, we estimate the strategy-
specific equations via OLS, including the inverse Mills ratio terms as 
regressors along with X in order to obtain unbiased estimates of β. 
The use of panel data can partially solve the problem: it may 
omit the need for instrumental variables or may give better information 
about firm’s performance under different strategy regimes. However, 
panel data models have their own assumptions which may make an 
obstacle to the purposes of strategy choice evaluation. First, the 
unobservables that affect performance under strategy choice 1S  are 
assumed to be the same as those influencing performance under 0S , i.e. 
would have the same effect under both strategies. Second, the error term 
is often assumed to consist of a time-invariant, firm-specific component, 
and a time-varying one that is uncorrelated across periods. This can be 
solved by the use of fixed-effects model which allows for correlation of 
the firm-specific time-invariant component with control variables and 
strategy choices. Finally, the coefficients relating the covariates to 
performance for each strategy are usually restricted to be equal, i.e. the 
treatment effect is assumed to be homogenous across firms and the 
covariates have the same impact on performance for both strategies. 
Even though more and more papers account for endogeneity, 
there are also numerous studies ignoring this issue. Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003) found that “of the 421 empirical papers published in 
the Strategic Management Journal (out of 601) between January, 1990, 
and December, 2001, we identify only 27 papers that explicitly 
econometrically correct for potential endogeneity concerns”. 
 
5. TCE in railways 
In railways, the problem arises when “steel meets steel” 
(Pittman (2005)). A track operator can make certain investments to 
improve efficiency and performance, but the realization of these benefits 
depends significantly on actions taken by the train operator. 
Correspondingly, a train operator can make certain investments to 
improve efficiency and performance, but the realization of these benefits 
depends significantly on actions taken by the track operator. The actions 
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in both directions are difficult to specify in a contract, difficult to 
observe and evaluate, and subject to shirking and opportunism. If 
contracting is not feasible and if the policy maker nevertheless forces the 
two sides to interact by contract, there is a risk of underinvestment on 
both sides, and economic welfare will suffer as a result. “The railways 
sector, then, may be a textbook example of the type of sector where the 
combination of relationship-specific investments, opportunistic 
behavior, and bounded rationality regarding a technologically complex 
environment would seem, under the transactions costs framework, to 
call for vertical integration of operations” (Pittman (2007)). 
Given all this, it seems unsurprising that the worldwide 
experience with vertical separation and third party access in the railway 
sector has brought ambiguous results. There has been an increase in the 
transparency of operations and thus an improved ability to target 
infrastructure subsidies (as in Sweden), but the level of competition 
created on the track has not been considerably increased (as in Germany 
and the Netherlands) and there have been serious problems with 
creating the proper incentives for maintaining and improving the 
infrastructure. The latter created the underinvestment problems in the 
UK in the 2001 and finally lead to serious railways accidents. The 
objective of maintaining and restructuring the old infrastructure seems 
likely to be also especially important in Russia and CIS countries, as 
well as in the Eastern European countries, where infrastructure 
degradation over the recent past is a serious problem and where long-
term government subsidies for infrastructure are generally insufficient. 
It is not clear yet what is to be gained, other than transparency, 
from the splitting off of operations such as repair facilities, stations 
management and other from the main enterprise. So far there seems to 
be no indication that the creation of competitive conditions for these 
support services is a high priority (Pittman (2007)). Gomez-Ibanez and 
de Rus (2006) also state that there is no uncontestable evidence that 
vertical separation improves performance; instead, the worldwide 
railway reforming experience demonstrate that, in general, vertically 
integrated railways are found to perform better. 
In this paper, we evaluate organizational decisions of Eastern 
European and former Soviet railways. We look at railway incumbent 
monopolists which were initially vertically integrated: whether they 
separated infrastructure management from operation or not. We don’t 
take into consideration independent operators which own some rolling 
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stock. Instead, we are interested in strategic decisions of railways which 
had to decide about legal separation, given that it was the mainstream 
reform trend in Europe (even in a less strong form). 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
6.1. Methodology 
We proceed in 2 steps. First, we apply probit estimation to the 
strategy choice equation in order to recover β and δ and to construct the 
inverse Mills ratio. Then, at the second step, using the results that we 
got at the first step, we estimate performance equations including Mills 
ratio for self-selection bias correction and finally answer the question 
what would have be the performance if the firms choosing some 
strategy Si have chosen the strategy Sj. 
1. The first step is analogous to so-called first-generation 
empirical tests. We estimate the impact of transactions characteristics 
(frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity) on the governance choice 
without taking into account the fact that the strategy is chosen in 
function of expected performance, i.e. we estimate only the differential 
effect of transaction attributes on the probability of a certain strategic 
decision. 
We estimate a simple probit regression where the dependent 
variable is VERT_SEP (0 if the railway is vertically integrated, 1 if legal 
separation took place) and where the characteristics of transactions are 
proxied as will be indicated below. 
2. At the second step, using the results obtained at the first step, 
we estimate the relationship between governance choice and 
performance, i.e. we answer the question what would happen if the 
firms applying actually the strategy “integrate” have implied the 
strategy “separate”. 
We use the methodology of Heckman and Lee described above 
in order to cope with the problem of endogeneity: strategy choice is not 
exogenous since managers rarely make decisions randomly; they take 
into account the expected performance. At the same time, the strategy 
choice depends on transaction characteristics. There are also some 
factors (control variables) which affect both the strategy choice and the 
performance. But the effect of control variables may be different across 
firms for 2 different samples (according to 2 different governance 
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choices), it is not homogenous. I.e. we assume that strategic decisions 
are taken taking into consideration expected benefits. 
The Heckman and Lee method helps to eliminate the 
interdependence of error terms of the two regressions if we estimated 2 
samples separately. The calculation of inverse Mills ratio and its 
introduction into the performance equation allows us to construct 
selection-corrected equations (which we will call “switching regression 
model”) and estimate them by OLS. 
 
6.2. Data 
Our data panel covers 12 years (1996-2007) and 28 railway 
incumbents operating in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet 
republics, 26 countries in total: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Hungary (2 railway companies), Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina (2 
railway companies). The empirical analysis is performed with an 
unbalanced panel data, the total number of observations equals to 296. 
It is worth noting that all these companies, with the exception of 
Estonia for a certain period of time14, are publicly owned. Any decision 
is thus always taken by the single owner – the government, i.e. the 
internal management decision, is these cases, corresponds to 
government decision, which would seem to be imposed from above. 
The railway companies considered in this study are quite 
heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is due to different environmental, 
topographical, technological and regulatory factors as well as different 
institutional and legislative frameworks. Nevertheless, the common 
characteristic of these companies is that they operate in countries that 
were under Soviet influence or control. All companies included in the 
sample are multi-output companies which provide two services: freight 
and passenger transportations. 
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
14 Estonian railway was privatized and then sold back to the state because the 
privatization didn’t bring the expected results in terms of performance and investment. 
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Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
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Min 220 1794 2,09 0 0,08 3,46 19,93 0,02 19,49 
Max 92217 1436300 120,45 1 11,63 21,14 3199,70 1465,90 785,07 
Mean 7558,58 89097,66 33,49 0,36 1,27 9,15 461,14 299,08 100,23 
Median 2322 17208 27,18 0,34 0,80 8,23 313,63 224,59 69,68 
St. dev. 15959,87 229808,80 29,02 0,28 1,52 3,45 458,99 259,67 107,84 
 
Russia (RZD) 86451,10 1242204 5,06 0,48 3,41 14,38 1347,66 1354,16 119,27 
Kazakhstan (KTZ) 13738,91 119368 5,05 0,28 2,01 8,71 1235,68 701,58 566,85 
Armenia (ARM) 844,40 4575 27,30 0,95 0,18 5,42 93,94 221,02 40,02 
Estonia (EVR) 969,90 5360 21,48 0,14 2,20 5,51 1718,71 199,71 48,07 
Poland (PKP) 21133,08 171014 66,85 0,56 1,12 8,00 446,72 295,63 71,44 
Romania (CFR) 11166,17 92701 46,80 0,35 0,50 8,26 319,58 248,49 89,83 
Albania (HSH) 442,42 2562 15,33 0,00 0,23 5,78 50,91 70,63 51,91 
* Descriptive statistics: over the whole sample 
** Country data: average across the period in question 
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The data are taken from the annual reports of the UIC (Union 
Internationale des Chemins de Fer), from the data published by the 
World Bank Railways Database and World Bank Governance Indicators 
Database (WGI). The WGI indicators contain missing values for some 
years; the gaps were filled by extrapolation of available data. 
 
6.3. Variables 
In order to apply so called second-generation empirical tests, we 
should construct 2 groups of variables: 
- Transaction characteristics (frequency, uncertainty and assets 
specificity); 
- Control variables which affect both the strategy choice and 
the performance. 
Besides, a performance measure (dependent variable) has to be 
chosen. 
Variables of each group are listed in the table below. Then, a 
discussion of the choice of variables follows. 
 
Table 2: Variables and their predicted signs 
Category and variable Expected result 
Binary strategy variable: VERT_SEP = 1 if legal separation took place, 0 if the company is 
vertically integrated 
Performance variable: EMPROD (employee productivity) 
 The impact on 
the strategy 
choice 
The impact 
on the 
performance 
Frequency 
VTKM_WAG  Virtual tkm divided by the aggregate 
wagon measure 
?  
Uncertainty 
 REGQUAL Quality of regulation +  
Assets specificity 
 ELECTR Share of electrified lines -  
 NETWDENS Network density -  
 EMPKM Employee per km of lines -  
Control variables 
GDP Gross domestic product  + 
USSR Dummy variable, 1 for former USSR 
members, 0 otherwise 
 ? 
AVLEADF Average lead, freight  - 
AVLEADP Average lead, passenger  + 
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Frequency 
The theory doesn’t give any clear predictions concerning the 
frequency of transactions (Crocker and Masten (1996)). From one hand, 
the more frequent transactions are, the higher is the reputation effect 
and the lower is the need for activity internalization. From the other 
hand, in the case of frequent transactions, integration may be preferred 
because it reduces transaction costs of market interaction (the number of 
interactions is high). 
The frequency of transactions is difficult to instrument because 
it’s not directly correlated with the organizational form: the decision 
about vertical integration or separation is usually taken by government, 
while the intensity of railway activity depends mostly on the demand 
for transportations. From the other side, we can say that for such public 
enterprises as railways the demand, to a certain extent, is also 
determined by government and its universal service obligations. 
Here, the frequency of transaction is reflected by the intensity of 
the use of railways. A relative productive measure can be taken, such as 
virtual tone-km, divided either by network length or by the number of 
wagons. Measures normalized by the number of wagons would be 
preferred: thus we evaluate the frequency of transactions of an isolated 
railway firm because we take into account only its own wagons, we 
create a measure of the intensity of use of company’s rolling stock 
providing a certain amount of virtual tkm (VTKM_WAG). In the case of 
open access to infrastructure, the normalization of virtual tkm of a 
railway by the length of total railway network in the country (used by 
several railway companies) doesn’t make sense. 
 
Uncertainty 
The theory assumes that a more risky environment leads to a 
higher degree of activity internalization. Here, three of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank could be used: Political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, Government effectiveness 
and Regulatory quality. 
Given that these three variables are highly correlated (pair-wise 
correlation more than 70%), the simultaneous inclusion of two or three 
of them will lead to multicollinearity, i.e. we have to choose among 
them the best indicator of uncertainty (or stability). We decided to use 
the variable “Regulatory quality” (REGQUAL) because it not only 
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reflects the political or economic stability in the country, but also covers 
the regulatory aspects, which is crucially important if we analyze 
railways reforms15. 
 “Regulatory Quality” measures the ability of the government to 
implement regulatory measures and promote private sector 
development. Higher regulatory quality implies lower uncertainty and 
will lead to higher degree of vertical separation because market rules 
will be better established. That is, the sign is expected to be positive. 
 
Assets specificity 
Among the three transactions characteristics, asset specificity is 
the most difficult to measure. Investments in specific assets are defined 
as “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower 
in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated” (see Williamson (1985)). Assets 
specificity increases the interdependence of contracting parties. It is 
likely that the more specific the investments are, the more probable is 
the vertical integration, especially in the case of an uncertain and 
unstable environment. 
Williamson (1983) defines five types of specificity: site specificity 
(assets placed in close proximity in order to minimize transportation or 
time costs or to benefit from complementary advantages), physical 
assets specificity (assets’ value in alternative uses is much lower), 
dedicated assets (investments in assets dedicated to a certain trading 
partner that otherwise would not be made), human assets specificity 
(human capital evolving due to learning of individuals), and intangible 
assets (for example brands).  
Among the common proxies Klein and Shelanski (1995) mention 
component complexity and R&D expenditure as proxies for physical 
asset specificity, worker-specific knowledge as a proxy for human asset 
specificity, and physical proximity of contracting firms as a proxy for 
site specificity. Other proxies, such as fixed costs or capital intensity, are 
rarely used. Another concern is that asset-specificity effects may be 
                                                 
15 “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” measures the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means. 
“Government Effectiveness” measures the quality of public services and their 
independence from political pressures, as well as the quality of public policy and the 
credibility of the government. 
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confused with market power. While specific investment may lead to 
bilateral monopoly, the existence of a small-numbers bargaining 
situation is not by itself evidence of relationship-specific investment 
(Klein and Shelanski (1995)). 
Physical assets specificity is very important on railways because 
the construction of new railway lines requires huge sunk investment. 
The investing party faces the risk to be held up by the other party in the 
extent of appropriable quasi rents. The lower the extent of quasi rents 
the more likely is a contractual solution, the higher the extent of quasi 
rents the more likely is integration. Specific investments under 
uncertainty lead to a strong incentive to internalize transactions. 
The best measure for assets specificity in railways would be the 
degree of assets redeployability (see Menard and Yvrande-
Billon (2005)), but the data on different types of freight wagons or 
locomotives and the diversity of their use is not available in the sample 
used. We have to use some other proxies reflecting the technical aspect 
of the production process. 
The first measure of assets specificity that we use is the share of 
electrified lines (ELECTR). The electrification can be considered as a 
huge sunk investment, the electrified lines can’t be used for purposes 
other than circulation of electric locomotives. According to the 
estimations of Ukrainian railways experts, the cost of electrification of 1 
km of lines is about $160 thousand. They assume that the optimal share 
of electrified lines is about 50-55% of total lines, while 90% of total 
freight transportations are made by electrified lines (RZD-Partner). 
Another measure of assets specificity is the density of network 
(NETWDENS). The construction of the network is a sunk investment as 
well. This is also a measure of physical assets specificity. However, the 
effect may be doubtful: in the case of vertical separation and existence of 
several independent operators, the network may be used by all of them. 
Finally, we use the indicator of the number of employees per km 
of lines (EMPKM). This covers the use of labor for infrastructure 
maintenance and rehabilitation. Low numbers indicate more intensive 
use of mechanical maintenance. It may be considered as a measure of 
assets specificity, i.e. we expect its impact on the probability of vertical 
separation to be negative. But from one hand, a lower number of 
employees per km means a higher use of mechanical inputs and sunk 
investment in the machinery (positive sign), while from the other hand, 
a higher number of employees per km means a higher investment in 
human assets (negative sign). 
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Masten, Mehan and Snyder (1991) found that “integration 
becomes more likely in the presence of relationship-specific human 
capital” and the firms are “less likely to integrate engineering-intensive 
activities and more likely to internalize labor-intensive ones”. That is, 
they also predict a negative sign of the human assets specificity 
coefficient. 
 
Control variables 
Control variables are assumed to affect both performance and 
strategy choice. 
GDP and USSR variables control for the importance of 
topographical and politico-economic situation. We may assume that 
countries of the former Soviet Union don’t tend to implement vertical 
separation, instead, those of the Eastern Europe try to adjust to 
European rules and norms. However, we can’t make definite 
predictions about its impact on the railway performance. As for GDP, 
the predicted sign is positive: the higher is the level of economic 
development in a country, the higher is the performance of its railway 
incumbent. 
Freight and passenger transportations represent different 
markets, and different regulatory measures are applied to these 
different market segments. The distinction between the role of freight 
and passenger transportations is made by using the measures of 
average lead, or average journey distance (AVLEADF and AVLEADP). 
They are calculated as tonne-km divided by tonnes and passenger-km 
divided by passengers respectively, and measures the average distance 
that a shipment or passenger travels. This measure can significantly 
influence the competitive position of freight transportations by railway, 
as rail’s competitive advantage comes into play more strongly at longer 
distances: organization of railway transportations in reasonable when 
the distance is more than ca. 500 km (Pittman (2001)) because of the time 
lost for loading wagons, especially in the case of intermodal 
transportations. 
According to the president of RZD Vladimir Yakunin, the 
increase of AVLEADF has a negative impact on the profitability of 
freight transportations because it decreases the turnover of rolling stock 
(this means that we expect a negative impact of AVLEADF on 
performance), i.e. increases the need in fleet units (Yakunin, RZD-
Partner). On shorter distances there is less need in rolling stock, and 
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even a small enterprise can operate, i.e. on shorter distances, huge 
incumbent railway will suffer more from competition. 
For passengers, rail faces auto and bus competition for short 
trips and air competition at long trips. The analysis of European 
railway market puts in evidence that passenger railway 
transportations are most efficient when the travel time is about 
2,5-3 hours, i.e. high-speed train services are reasonable on 
distances of 300 to 800 km. In such cases, railway transport is 
more competitive than air transport. Recent data show that, in 
Western Europe, about 60-85% of passengers use high-speed train 
services (RZD-Partner). 
If the railway exhibits a relatively short length of average trip 
(<50 km or so), then the railway would normally be carrying a high 
percentage of suburban passengers. A railway with a long passenger 
trip length (>400 km) would typically indicate a large country in which 
the railway is not carrying a high proportion of suburban passengers. 
Unfortunately, the data doesn’t allow to distinguish between 
short-length commuter and regional trains (which are usually not 
profitable and subsidized) and long-distance trains (which are relatively 
more profitable). The profitability and the level of competition 
(intramodal, from high-speed high-class trains, and intermodal, from 
airlines) are different on these 2 segments. The longer is the distance, the 
higher is the competition, the more is the propensity to remain 
integrated for the incumbent in order to survive: getting high profits on 
long-distance segment, it can provide non-profitable short-distance 
transportations. At the same time, a higher average lead of passenger 
transportations may mean a lower share of unprofitable short-distance 
transportations and consequently a higher performance.  
 
As the dependent variable which measure productivity we use 
the indicator of employee productivity (EMPROD) taken from the 
World Bank railway database. It is measures as the ratio TU/employee, 
where TU is the sum of passenger-km and freight tone-km. Labor costs 
are the largest cost item for all railways, so the output per employee is 
one of the fundamental measures of performance. 
 
 92 
 
6.4. The model 
SIMPLE PROBIT 
At the first step, we estimate the equation: 
Strategy = S (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity), 
The strategy in our case is a binary variable VERT_SEP which is 
equal to zero if the railway is vertically integrated and 1 if legal 
separation took place. The frequency of transactions is proxied by the 
variable VTKM_WAG. To model assets specificity, we used 
NETWDENS, EMPKM and ELECTR. For uncertainty (or stability in our 
case), we use the variable REGQUAL. I.e. we estimate the equation: 
ititit
itititit
WAGVTKMNETWDENS
ELECTREMPKMREGQUALSEPVERT
εββ
ββββ
+++
++++=
_
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SECOND GENERATION TESTS 
Here, we relate performance values directly to organizational 
choices. We assume that the manager (the government in our case), 
when choosing a strategy, takes into account the expected performance 
which depends on the strategy choice. We have to estimate 2 equations: 
Strategy = S (frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity), 
Performance = П (strategy, control variables) 
Transaction characteristics (frequency, uncertainty, assets 
specificity) are defined as at the previous step. As for control variables, 
we use the following measures: AVLEADF, AVLEADP, USSR and GDP, 
and EMPROD as a measure of performance. We use the inverse Mills-
ratio methodology described above. I.e. we estimate the equations: 
ititit
itititit
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εββ
ββββ
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6.5. Results 
First-step estimation results, when the performance doesn’t 
come into play, are shown in Table 3. The table contains 3 possible 
specifications, they all could be acceptable, but the third one (M3) seems 
to be the most reasonable. However, they are persistent to these small 
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modifications: the all give very similar results for coefficients and their 
significance. 
 
Table 3: Results of the first step (p-values in parentheses) 
 Variables M1 M2 M3 
Uncertainty 
REGQUAL 2,805 
(0,001) 
3,240 
(0,000) 
2,734 
(0,000) 
EMPKM -0,764 
(0,000) 
-0,699 
(0,000) 
-0,679 
(0,000) 
ELECTR 2,936 
(0,137) 
2,975 
(0,119) 
- 
Assets specificity 
NETWDENS 0,022 
(0,210) 
- - 
Frequency 
VTKM_WAG -0,179 
(0,508) 
-0,263 
(0,310) 
-0,171 
(0,496) 
Pseudo R2 
 0,44 0,43 0,42 
 
As expected, in a more certain environment (REGQUAL is an 
inverse measure of uncertainty) vertical separation is more probable. 
The frequency of transactions, instead, reduces the intention to keep a 
vertically integrated structure, probably because of the reputation effect 
and well functioning interconnections. But the variable reflecting 
frequency (VTKM_WAG) didn’t brought significant results in any of the 
three model specifications, i.e. it doesn’t really matter when choosing 
the governance form. The sign of human assets specificity (EMPKM) 
also corresponds to the one predicted by the theory: the more specific 
are the assets, the less probable is vertical integration. However, in the 
case of physical assets, the data doesn’t reveal any highly significant 
dependence, and the positive signs of the ELECTR and NETWDENS 
variables, even if only slightly significant, contradict to the theory. 
The non-significant coefficient of the ELECTR variable reveals an 
interesting fact: the investment in electrification, although considerable, 
is not specific to some type of railway transportations; moreover, it’s not 
specific to railway activity in general. For instance, the communications 
constructed for railway purposes can be later used for telephony or 
internet: it’s much cheaper and easier to put new cables (e.g. for 
telecom) on the already existing ways instead of creating a new line in 
the middle of wood, mountains or even a city landscape. 
A similar explanation can be provided for the positive coefficient 
of the NETWDENS variable: the denser is the network, the larger are 
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the possibilities of its alternative use, that is, the less is the risk of a hold-
up and the less is the intention to remain integrated. 
If we look at outliers (the observations for which 
|__ˆ| SEPVERTSEPTVER −  is maximal), we discover among them the 
following railways: the Romanian railway, the ZBH of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the MAV of Hungary, the Estonian railway, the Latvian 
railway and the Slovenian railway. I.e. these are the railways which 
have probably adopted the “wrong” strategy from the point of view of 
transaction costs economics, which haven’t taken into account the 
institutional environment in terms of uncertainty, frequency of 
transactions and assets specificity. In the case of Romania and Estonia it 
could be, as mentioned by Diaconu et al. (2007), “more catholic than the 
Pope”: they went too far and too fast in their desire to implement legal 
separation. 
 
The second step was to take into account the expected 
performance and, using the results of the first step, to construct the 
inverse Mills ratios for self-selection bias correction, to answer the 
questions whether there is a positive or negative self-selection among 
the firms choosing a certain strategy. We present here the results for all 
the three model specifications (M1, M2 and M3) and, again, find them 
persistent independently of the specification. 
 
Table 4: Results of the second step (p-values in parentheses) 
Variables Strategy 1 (legal separation) Strategy 0 (vertical integration) 
M1 
GDP 0,053 
(0,031) 
0,079 
(0,000) 
USSR 1801,227 
(0,000) 
237,983 
(0,005) 
AVLEADF -1,931 
(0,161) 
0,351 
(0,000) 
AVLEADP 7,825 
(0,034) 
2,288 
(0,000) 
Mills ratio 32,121 
(0,507) 
-90,469 
(0,048) 
σU 240,593 180,713 
R-squared 
within 
between 
overall 
 
0,184 
0,881 
0,794 
 
0,592 
0,599 
0,638 
M2 
GDP 0,050 0,082 
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(0,041) (0,000) 
USSR 1806,744 
(0,000) 
237,830 
(0,004) 
AVLEADF -1,958 
(0,157) 
0,351 
(0,000) 
AVLEADP 7,967 
(0,032) 
2,280 
(0,000) 
Mills ratio 40,231 
(0,412) 
-90,469 
(0,015) 
σU 242,918 180,537 
R-squared 
within 
between 
overall 
 
0,186 
0,883 
0,797 
 
0,595 
0,604 
0,642 
M3 
GDP 0,049 
(0,050) 
0,081 
(0,000) 
USSR 1808,452 
(0,000) 
238,185 
(0,005) 
AVLEADF -2,066 
(0,128) 
0,352 
(0,000) 
AVLEADP 8,093 
(0,027) 
2,287 
(0,000) 
Mills ratio 44,639 
(0,394) 
-81,018 
(0,028) 
σU 232,414 181,991 
R-squared 
within 
between 
overall 
 
0,184 
0,885 
0,799 
 
0,594 
0,602 
0,640 
 
We talk about self-selection bias if the coefficients of Mills ratio 
are significantly different from 0. If the coefficient for S0 (vertical 
integration) is significantly negative, this means that firms tend to 
choose S0 when unobserved conditions are such that choosing this 
strategy brings them higher performance; instead, these unobservable 
characteristics would have lead to a lower performance if they have 
chosen S1 (legal separation). Correspondingly, firms self-select in a 
rational way, following unobserved conditions, when the difference of 
Mills ratio coefficients Mills0-Mills1<0, as we can observe in our case, 
whatever is the model chosen (M1, M2 or M3). I.e., if we take into 
consideration unobserved conditions, the firms try to choose the 
solution which will allow them to obtain the highest performance if this 
difference is negative. In our case, we have a self-selection bias, from the 
point of view of unobservables, in favour of S0, i.e. vertically integrated 
companies. 
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The sigmas tell us about comparative advantages. In all of the 
three models, we have 01 >uσ  which means that there is negative 
selection into strategy, i.e. firms choosing S1 (legal separation) have 
below average performance. In the case 00 >uσ  we have positive 
selection into strategy S0 (vertical integration). Putting together, the S0 
firms possess the absolute advantage: firms choosing S0 have above 
average performance regardless of the strategy chosen, i.e. even if this 
sub-sample of firms had chosen S1, they would still perform better. 
If we now look at control variables, we can observe different 
signs and different levels of significance of coefficients, which proves 
theoretical assumptions of the TCE that strategy choices of the two 
groups are affected by different factors. For instance, in both samples 
we note a higher performance of former Soviet railways and a higher 
performance of more developed countries (higher GDP per capita). 
Average lead in freight transportations, instead, has different signs in 
the two samples: it is negative, as predicted, and weakly significant for 
separated railways and positive and significant for integrated ones, i.e. 
competitive advantages of railways at long distances are remarkable 
only for vertically integrated railways, while vertically separated 
railways loose their performance on longer distances. The positive sign 
of average lead in passenger transportations supports the statement 
about non-profitable short-distance (commuter or regional) 
transportations: when short-distance transportations prevail, the 
performance is relatively lower, and it’s true for both sub-samples. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, the basic statements of transaction costs economics 
have been empirically tested on the sample of Eastern European and 
former Soviet railways. The idea was to investigate how the transactions 
characteristics – frequency, uncertainty and assets specificity – 
determine the governance form, i.e. how they impact the decision to 
separate or keep integrated initially vertically integrated railway 
incumbents. Another aspect to cover was to take into account the 
expected performance when taking a governance decision and detect 
whether there is a self-selection bias in strategy choices of vertically 
integrated or vertically separated railways. For this purpose, so called 
“second generation tests” of the transaction costs economics were 
applied. 
The results in general correspond to theory predictions. 
Uncertainty and assets specificity have the predicted signs, while the 
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frequency is found to be not significant (probably this is due to the lack 
of good instruments). If we take into account the expected performance 
depending on governance structure, we discover, first, that the results 
differ for two samples (vertically integrated vs. separated railways), and 
second, that integrated firms are absolutely advantageous: firms which 
were in the strategy sample “to remain integrated” have above average 
performance regardless anyway, even if they would have chosen the 
strategy “to separate”. 
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